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Abstract:
In this Independent Study thesis for the College of Wooster, I analyze and test the core works
of Suzanne Mettler and Gosta Esping Andersen in a two-model comparative case study
between the United States and the United Kingdom. Drawing on 95 sources, this paper
critically looks at two competing models, trying to capture the motivations and key factors at
play within welfare policy development both in the U.S. and UK. My purpose is to
understand why and how these supposedly similar welfare states, both facing a new socioeconomic crisis in the form of youth unemployment, will react and develop new social policy
to address this growing issue. The findings show flaws in conventional assumptions when
trying to predict social policy behavior in liberal welfare states.
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Introduction
The world finds itself in a major period of transition and restructuring in the wake of the
2008 financial crisis as it works to reconcile state interests for austerity with the increasing
social pressures and social constraints of an economic crisis within its welfare regimes. This
is clear when looking to the record highs of civil unrest related to levels of inequality and
unemployment not seen in generations. In particular, youth unemployment is the emerging
marginalized community which is bearing the brunt of this unemployment and inequality
pandemic. In this vein, I looked to examine the policy trends that occur as a result of the
recent economic crisis because it is my goal to understand whether the current policy
behavior models will be sufficient to explain how countries will react to new policy concerns
of youth unemployment and unprecedented social risk.
This paper aims to critically look at conventional wisdom, about the motivations and key
factors at play, in welfare policy development within the United States and the United
Kingdom; which are generally considered to be two of the stingiest welfare states. The goal
will be to understand how these welfare systems will react to the growing at risk group of
unemployed youth in the aftermath of a major global economic recession and determine if
the plight for the unemployed youth in these countries is as bad as current media indicators
and experts might have us believe. The famous labor economist Robert Reich, former
Secretary of Labor, says in his critically acclaimed documentary, “Inequality For All,” that
the economic outlook for young people is as bad as it was in the great depression, but will the
current policy trends continue to promote inequality or will young people be able to find a
way to pressure the legislative process to respond with more egalitarian shifts in the social
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assistance programs that they offer? Why and how are these “welfare regimes,” currently
facing similar socio-economic constraints in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, choosing
to engage in different policy options in the form of welfare retrenchment versus stability or
expansion? These are generation defining questions that are facing youth universally among
all struggling labor markets in the developed western welfare states.
In the following chapters I seek to capture the common frameworks by which welfare
theorists seek to provide answers to those questions above. In chapter 1, I explore what the
literature tells us about the framework and models of social policy development. In chapter 2,
I extrapolate on two prevalent models in the general literature and discuss how I will
operationalize those modes and test their explanatory power when applied to the United
Kingdom and the United States as a comparative case study. In chapter three, I carry out the
first of my two case studies by completing both models in succession as they apply to the
United Kingdom. In the fourth chapter, I continue my comparative case study by laying out
the chosen models as they apply to the United States. In the fifth and final chapter, I
complete the case study by doing a comparative analysis where I discuss both the basic
trends captured by the evidence collected and how they fit and do not fit the predictions in
the literature. Furthermore, I present an analysis of the general literature and potential gaps in
the models where further academic research would be beneficial to further our understanding
of welfare policy behavior, particularly as it relates to times of crisis.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review
Addressing the world of welfare development has for some time been considered a fairly
straightforward relationship. As far as welfare states go, they are pretty homogenous in their
general social constraints in that they tend to be advanced western economies with varying
levels of democratic representation in these countries. Because of this, many authors feel
confident that there are simple explanations that can be used to interpret the policy patterns
of different welfare states. In fact, these experts, “since the early 1970’s, generally identify
three distinct welfare state responses to economic and social change (Andersen 1996, 10).
The root of these distinctions which separate the three welfare state typologies are, for many
authors including Gosta Esping Andersen, the varying clusters of national values.
Specifically, among these operationally different welfare states it is important to understand
how these national values translate into “the degree of political consensus required for
preserving broad support… for the taxes that a welfare state model demands” (Andersen
1990, 26). Different values and policy framework clusters are the defining characteristic of
Andersen’s work, which has culminated in his now famous model of the “Three Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism” which outlines the legislative feedback of welfare policy development
“explicitly as a form of class politics” (Andersen 1990, 24). This function of class politics is
further clarified where the “history of political coalitions is the most decisive cause of
welfare state variations” (Andersen 1990, 1). In other words, welfare protections and
spending are systematically linked with national values and political legitimacy in traditional
categorizations of policy behavior.
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In particular this general theory was developed with the goal of tracking and explaining
welfare state growth as well as its retrenchment regarding social policy development. In
theory this development and policy trend of growth or retrenchment should follow basic
trends of societal approval or backlash in democratic societies. In this vein, it is important to
understand that this theory of policy behavior forwarded by Andersen sees “the welfare state
not just as a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality;
it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering of social
relations” (Andersen 1990, 23). Further, it is this stratification of target equality versus
inequality which helps explain “why some groups are advantaged more than others
independently of traditional notions of political power and how policy designs reinforce or
alter such advantages” (Ingram and Schneider 1993, 334). Moreover, for the purposes of this
study which examines the potential for assistance to a newly emerging community of
unemployed youth in the aftermath of an economic recession, Andersen’s model expects “the
class coalitions in which the three welfare state regime types were founded, explain not only
their past evolution but also their future prospects” (Andersen 1990, 33).

The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
I. The Social Democratic State
The gold standard of welfare state policy is represented by states such as Denmark,
Norway and Sweden. The reason for this is that the shapes of policy expenditures throughout
Scandinavia are imbedded with “features of luxury to satisfy the wants of a more
discriminating public” (Andersen 1990, 32). As a point of clarification, Andersen means that
the focus of what he designates as the “Social Democratic” system of welfare is a largely
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redistributive one which focuses on high taxes in order to establish greater equality and a
universally targeted middle class. In other words, “in Scandinavia, the fortunes of social
democracy over the past decades were closely tied to the establishment of a middle-class
welfare state that benefits both its traditional working-class clientele and the new white-collar
strata” (Andersen 1990, 32). The Scandinavian welfare states are clearly focused on and
identity of a middle class society with high class mobilization and broad universal program
initiatives with more or less indiscriminant targets. According to the basis of Andersen’s
theory of policy behavior, there must be a reason why these broad based targets are seen to
be politically deserving of such high levels of support despite the great expense of such
inclusive social insurance methods.
Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, leaders in the field of understanding target legitimacy
and policy accountability, explain “social constructions [indeed] influence the policy agenda
and the selection of policy tools, as well as the rationales that legitimate policy choices”
(1993, 334). One particular reason that the social democratic system is able to legitimatize
such broad targets and be willing to accept the extraordinarily high costs of welfare that such
programs generate is that these countries are highly homogenous in both ethnicity and
culture. Thus it is much easier to understand why the national values of these states include a
focus on supporting the working class so that all can enjoy the security and lifestyle of the
middle class. In essence, the social assistance in this model is based on ideals of equality and
social solidarity because there exists a high level of common interests which place a great
value on the entitlement to “social resources, health, education [as a precondition] to
participate effectively as a social citizen” (Andersen 1990, 12).
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II. The Structuralist (Corporatist-Statist) State
To reiterate, Andersen’s theory rests rather clearly and understandably upon opinions
as the driver of these intuitionally different approaches to welfare distribution as well as
differences in welfare goals. One major factor he relies on is the belief that socially
aggregated opinions and values capture the level of class conflict which he asserts impacts
the input of these national values as they are related through the legislative process and
political legitimation of targeting specific recipients over others. In the Social Democracy
model, as seen above, there is remarkably little class conflict, and thus, there is a strong level
of universal support for high equality with redistributive measures in place to effect real
changes in the socio economic landscape. The essence of this “regime cluster is composed of
those countries… that would promote an equality of the highest standards, not an equality of
minimal needs as was pursued elsewhere” (Andersen 1990, 27). For the Corporatist state
however, “what predominated was the preservation of status differentials; rights, therefore,
were attached to class and status” (Ibid at 27). In other words, this second model of welfare
regime is strife with class conflict as compared to the homogenous and egalitarian
Scandinavian model.
In order to understand those differences however, it is antecedently important to
understand how the Corporatist and Social Democratic models work in similar ways. One
interesting point of comparison between the two outlined types of welfare states enumerated
thus far is that both types of welfare regimes, despite differences in specific targets and goals
of policies, do place an emphasis on the de-commodification of assistance as a way to
circumvent market dependency and labor participation during times of necessary withdrawal
from working in the labor force, “hence private insurance benefits play a truly marginal role”
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(Andersen 1990, 27). These times of necessity are directly tied to indicators of legitimacy
and often defined in a given welfare context as socially encouraged activities. It follows then
that particularly when something forcibly removes someone from the labor force (meaning
they have no control over the circumstances which demand an absence) there is a fairly broad
consensus that protections should be extended in that circumstances because the target is
perceived to be weak and in need, thus deserving of assistance. Conversely, instances of
voluntarily opting out of working can easily be seen as an act of delinquency or free loading,
and as such, much less deserving of assistance despite being similarly removed from means
by which to participate in society. The range in between these measures are what interest
Andersen and best give shape to his different models where the Scandinavian welfare states
tend to be the most de-commodifying (least strict with providing assistance in matters of
opting out of the labor market when individuals deem it necessary); the Anglo-Saxon the
least (the third regime type).
For the Corporatist welfare state, observers see “a labyrinth of status specific
insurance funds” (Andersen 1990, 24). This means that for matters of persons opting out of
the labor force, there are specific types of readily and universally accepted targets of social
assistance, such as “pensions, maternity leave, parental leave, educational leave, and
unemployment insurance,” however it is worth noting that in this system “guaranteed
benefits are equal to normal earnings” (Andersen 1990, 23). In other words, with this second
type of welfare state formulation, Andersen observes “a state edifice perfectly ready to
displace the market as a provider of welfare” just as with the Scandinavian case (Ibid at 27).
Yet, unlike the Scandinavian formulation of equality and egalitarianism, “the state’s
emphasis, [in Corporatist states like Austria, Germany and Italy,] on upholding the status
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differences means that its redistributive impacts are negligible” (Andersen 1990, 27). Thus it
can be noted that this particular formulation would suggest that these primarily Germanic and
continental welfare states appear to have highly segregated national values that are held
captive to political values which are aggregated in the social elite so that the marginalized
groups of individuals are fairly “limited in their capacity for collective solidarity and
mobilization… [leaving them] dependent on decisions and forces beyond their control”
(Andersen 1990, 16). This would forward a context where there may be high protections for
the unemployed upper echelon citizens but likely very little of this assistance would be made
available to the unestablished and economically weak group of unemployed youth.

III. The Anglo-Saxon (Liberal) Welfare State

The final group of welfare states are primarily organized as the group of most
westernized and market oriented welfare economies like the United States, United Kingdom
and Australia. Particularly, these countries deviate from the basic norms of welfare delivery
because unlike the previous systems, the Liberal welfare state focuses more on the
marketization, rather than the de-commodification of welfare benefits. In essence, the
national values of target legitimacy are often seen to be the strictest in this cluster of welfare
regimes according to highly normalized work-ethic norms and an emphasis on self-reliance
in the marketplace. Further, Andersen categorizes the behavior of this cluster as fairly
straightforward and highly standardized in its approach; “In one cluster we find the Liberal
welfare state, in which means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest-social
insurance plans predominate” (Andersen 1990, 26). In other words, the Liberal welfare
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states, in theory, act both similarly to the Scandinavian model in that both deliver services
which benefit individuals on a universally redistributive standard, noting of course, that the
assistance given by each state redistributes towards very different socially approved points.
The Anglo-Saxon model, as is found in the U.S., redistributes based on culturally defined
minimum needs rather than middle class standards of living as one might expect in the Social
Democratic model. In other words, the Liberal welfare state is assumed to be little more than
a set of minimalist safety nets leaving private entity providers of welfare and risk protection
to lead the way as the primary institutions by which people receive benefits. This assertion
follows the reasoning that “benefits [of state based programs] cater mainly to a clientele of
the low-income, usually working-class, state dependents” leaving the middle and upper-class
to utilize private institutions such as employers which provide similar programs as parts of
compensation and incentive packages (Andersen 1990, 26). As for the unemployed youth in
the Liberal welfare state, just as in the Scandinavian model, so long as the unemployment can
be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the policy makers and not perceived as delinquency in the
eyes of the public, benefits will be extended unilaterally.
However this is a bold assumption and has been challenged not only by many
theorists but also by empirical data. In particular, Andersen’s theory holds that the main
target of welfare policies, in his liberal typology, should be the lowest income groups who
cannot compete in the market. Empirically however, Suzanne Mettler and Christopher
Howard show that the redistributive properties US welfare programs directed towards these
individuals are negligible while providing assistance to the rich in the form of tax cuts which
tend to be exaggerating inequalities. Further, there is the assumption that there is consensus
in the national values regarding the need for money spent protecting these marginalized and
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economically weak groups based on maintaining minimal qualities of life. However, authors
like Schneider and Ingraham show that in individualistic societies like the US, and in theory
the UK, many people believe such programs are ineffective and create dependency rather
than a productive member of society.

What’s really going on?
In fact, the welfare state as we know it appears to be under duress, facing cases of
what many onlookers and experts would categorize as necessary phases of systematic welfare
retrenchment during steady economic decline and a debt crisis among the affluent European
and developed western economies throughout the world. Indeed, it is no secret that even the
Scandinavian welfare states, which have been the model for pushing the boundaries of social
insurance and government led redistribution, have been forced to make noticeable spending
cuts according to the aggregated spending data compiled by the Organization for Economic
Co-Operation and Development. Despite this outward impression of the welfare expenditures
and welfare budgets under fire, it remains unclear whether or not any actual or significant
change is occurring. For this reason, many authors have made it their goal to better capture
the pulse of welfare states, and in doing so understand how different states will respond to
future socio economic challenges. This process begins with understanding the capacity of a
given welfare state to provide protection to its beneficiaries. However, when beginning to
examine the sum of a States’ welfare programs, many authors such as Christopher Howard
already believe that the world and the media rely far too heavily on the traditional
measurements of direct welfare spending as a portion of GDP to define the character of a
welfare state. Howard explains that this general measurement of different states “generosity”
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fails to hit the mark in terms of assessing the true nature or state of affairs within the welfare
state. Instead authors like Suzanne Mettler, along with Christopher Howard, are more
concerned with understanding the level of equality, or in fact inequality, that is generated
from the welfare distribution policies and programs that are in place within a given welfare
regime.
In other words, when assessing the policies of a given welfare state it is far less
important to understand how a state will react when facing financial pressures to retrench its
programs, and far more important to understand how that same state will determine who
receives the benefits which are still available. The general idea that a government will want
to spend less on social policies when forced to make cutbacks is not difficult to understand,
however, it becomes more complex when in that recession there is a growing demand and
need for such government assistance. There is a basic logic to understanding that when there
is an economic recession, “welfare rolls” increase, which in turn means that the cost of
programs go up at the same time as the government has less money to distribute lest major
changes occur within the program benefits or targets. This conundrum in particular is what
highlights the need to carefully analyze the stability and shape of welfare policies to answer
whether or not “the welfare state has continued to provide the inclusive social protection that
defined its goals and operations in the immediate decades after World War II?” (Hacker
2004, 243). Unfortunately, there are serious problems with this question, posed by researcher
Jacob Hacker, problems which are best illuminated by Christopher Howard who
demonstrates the flaw of measuring the success of welfare states against a standard goal or
normative idea of social protection. This is, in part, because the modern welfare state policy
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development “should itself be seen as a process that is highly mediated by politics… In an
environment of new or worsening social risks” (Hacker 2004, 246).

The Welfare State Nobody Knows
The United States is one such example of a complicated, more than meets the eyes
welfare system. Christopher Howard best outlines this point in his chief evaluation of the
American welfare state, calling it “The Welfare State Nobody Knows.” In his first chapter,
“She’s So Unusual,” the reader is set up to take away that this title is fairly misleading and
only represents a fraction of the truth. Perhaps a better title would read: “She’s So
Misunderstood,” this would-be title offers a more apt summary of Howard’s point, and
framing of the common question among welfare scholars, which asks if the American
welfare state is unusually small? To answer this question, Howard reexamines the techniques
used by other scholars to examine the American welfare system as well as all other basic
welfare states. Howard’s conclusion is simple, there are serious methodological shortcomings
inherent in traditional measurement techniques, whether it be the portion of GDP spent on
social assistance programs and grants, or an accounting of cross national coverage programs
as a measure of the scope of assistance offered by a welfare state, which belie and belittle
other policy tools and forms of social spending which address welfare issues in alternative
ways. In other words, the argument is made by Howard as well as other prominent theorists
such as Jacob Hacker and Suzanne Mettler, that certain political complexities such as the
legislative practices and distributive institutions make the measurement of any policy
response (particularly where changes in policy trends are concerned) more difficult to
identify. The core issue of such wrongful measurements, like direct public expenditures, is
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what Howard identifies as the pervasive need of scholars to measure programs in the United
States against programs in continental Europe or Scandinavia, and by doing so, leap to the
conclusion that the United States does very little. This conclusion, while on some level can
be fairly accurate, does not sit well with many onlookers of the social policy development
process. Jacob Hacker, in particular, argues that there are several different strategies to
accomplish meaningful policy change and the scope and shape of those changes depend on
who’s interest are in play. For this reason, Hacker advises caution, because “looking only at
affirmative choices on predefined issues, retrenchment analyses tend to downplay the
important ways in which actors may shape and restrict the agenda of debate and prevent
some kinds of collective decisions altogether” giving off the appearance of a laggard welfare
state (Hacker 2004, 245). Indeed, Howard emphasizes the presence of hasty generalizations
about the U.S. welfare state, which in their nature encourage skewed perceptions about the
benefits available to individuals and groups in the system. One such example of this can be
found in Howard’s brief case study of United States Housing Policy.
Under the traditional welfare policy analysts’ microscope, which Howard uses to
mean the basic measurement of direct government spending in areas like social insurance and
grants, we see that when exclusively examining public or low income housing subsidies, the
United States does very little, relative to “government subsidized residential units” among all
the affluent European Union based welfare states. In fact, the number of such direct subsidies
for housing units as a percent of the total housing units represents “less than 5 percent of all
residential dwellings in the United States. Government subsidized rental units account for
about 15 percent of all dwellings in France and Germany, 25 percent in the United Kingdom
and Denmark, and 40 percent in the Netherlands” (Howard 2007, 20). However, this picture
Page | 19

of U.S. Housing policy is incomplete according to Howard. Instead, policy analysts must
broaden their measurement perspectives to include different policy tools which may
indirectly address welfare issues like subsidized housing without visible public spending
programs. Some of these policy tools include low interest loan guarantees for low income
individuals looking to buy a house as well as tax credits for new home owners. Back to the
case study regarding U.S. housing policy coverage, “if we conservatively assume substantial
overlap between home owners who receive benefit from loan guarantees and tax
expenditures, then total U.S. assistance to housing would be in the range of 35 to 40 percent”
(Howard 2007, 20). This stark difference as compared to the initial 5 percent coverage is not
just an isolated occurrence but instead represents the fairly standard way in which the
American welfare state is misunderstood and the ruler by which analysts compare welfare
states is insufficient. Howard paints a fairly optimistic portrait in this way, but Hacker and
Mettler would note the type of interests that are backing this conglomeration of visible and
invisible housing assistance policies are the most important factors in determining both why
the U.S. operates so differently than other developed welfare states around the world. In
particular, to ascertain the interests reflected in the policy decision making, Hacker wishes to
look at the targets of policies as well as the “political feedback effects” those targets have on
the legislative process. Thus for Howard’s housing policy case study, Hacker might explain
that the reason it appears so lackluster at first glance is because the targets are not so focused
on offering the social protection to the poorest members of society who, like in other welfare
states, would otherwise not be able to afford housing. Instead, the American tax expenditure
and low interest loan guarantees are targeted more at supporting the middle class voting and
tax base. In this case, there is strong political motivation to allocate spending to this group of
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the population; however there are clear political problems with visibly targeted constituents
based on support rather than need as can be observed in many experiments conducted by
Suzanne Mettler which show that individuals across the income levels “once informed of
policy effects, were inclined to articulate policy preferences that favored the interests of the
less well-off” (Mettler 2011, 65). So in this case, there is less visible assistance distribution
and a policy strategy which is meant to obscure the scope and targets of housing policy in the
US.
Nevertheless, the idea Howard is underlining is this: there is more than one way
to finance or satisfy welfare policy objectives. This is certainly an observation which is
critical to pay attention to. In an individual centered society like the United States, these
different tools can even include government regulation in the form of what Howard calls
“publically mandated private social expenditure” (Howard 2007, 18) or even the personal
pursuit of legal compensation from private actors. Either way, the American welfare state
certainly functions in its own unique way and does not and should not necessarily be
confined to the measuring tools set by different European welfare state. This point is made
more clearly with an example regarding the percent of GDP which is distributed among
different social expenditures. Under the traditional scope we see that the United States falls
pretty much at the bottom of affluent welfare states at approximately 15 percent of GDP
according to table 1.1 (Howard 2007, 15). However, there is plenty of evidence hinting that
the indirect policy tools of the American welfare state are not that small and in fact are really
pretty average among the low spending welfare states like Canada and the UK. But the
percentages of spending might not do actual spending figures any justice. Take the
comparison laid out by Howard, which shows that Bill and Melinda Gates only spend about 2
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percent of their annual expenses on food, which as compared to the national average of 14
percent would, at face value, appear to be an appalling gap. A gap which might suggest
malnourishment or starvation. However, as Howard points out, “with people as rich as the
Gates family, it might make more sense to calculate the spending per person. The same is
true when comparing the size of welfare states” (Howard 2007, 23). In other words, “because
the U.S. has the largest GDP and GDP per capita…the U.S. government can devote a
relatively smaller share of its GDP to social welfare and still spend more per person than
those nations devoting a higher share of GDP” (Howard 2007, 23). A fair point certainly, but
the picture still remains fuzzy when we put Howard’s claim for the U.S. welfare state, which
argues traditions of less spending might not actually mean “less spending,” particularly when
we apply Hacker’s important questions which consider the targets and political factors of
policy development strategies. These two claims put next to each other might suggest that the
United States is not unique so much in what it contributes to social assistance but rather
unique in whom it has chosen to design its welfare state around as the primary recipients.
This experience is particularly problematic because it highlights the limited awareness and,
in turn, the capabilities of social consensus building on future policy decisions. In other
words, it makes the point that the American welfare state promotes growing social inequality.
But is this merely an inherent trait of the American welfare system, where some are meant to
be left out while others cared for based on “past social policy choices [which] create strongly
vested interests and expectations” (Hacker 2004, 245). Or perhaps, as Suzanne Mettler would
argue, there is a visibility issue within policy development and the fate of welfare programs
to be skewed towards the powerful and entrenched political interests only holds true so long
as the design and delivery mechanisms of such programs remain hidden.
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Complications in the Two Tiers Model
Under traditional lenses of policy development the answer may have seemed clear,
and the evidence may have sufficiently supported a path dependency argument without much
room for disagreement. However, there are now gaps in the evidence where authors have
shown growing support from groups, “including majorities of Republicans and high earners,”
for the expansion of the EITC which gives tax refunds to poor working families (Mettler
2011, 65). Clearly, these two competing policy development theories hold important
implications about the understanding of future social policy design within welfare states.
This important query is one that must be remembered and is further explored by Howard in
chapter two of his book, “Tracks of My Tiers,” which is both an examination of the popular
two-tiered model of the U.S. welfare state as well as a reconstitution of one of the
overarching themes of his book, outlining the “need to describe something accurately before
trying to explain it” (Howard 2007, 26). Similar to the misconceptions regarding the size and
scope of the American welfare state under traditional measures, Howard argues there is a
large level of misunderstanding associated with the defining of the American welfare state
from within, as a “two tiered” system. The main idea behind these two distinct and separate
tiers is to separate those policies which represent wide bearing and generous social insurance
programs for the general population versus more stringently regulated means tested programs
of social assistance for the poorest segments of society. Analysts of the American welfare
state seem quick to jump to broad generalizations and look primarily to single programs by
which to make these comparisons. Of course, this trend would seem to be in keeping with
the path dependency model, and as such, is what Howard classifies as an example of the
wrongheaded analysis offered up by path dependency theorists. Further Howard aims to
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reveal the narrow understanding of path dependency, showing the basis of such two-tier
models which compare programs like “social security [which] is supposed to represent the
upper tier of European style insurance programs” (Howard 2007, 29) and programs like the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children. However, anyone who looks closely can see that
there are numerous issues with using such skewed policy models, even within the two tiers.
The major problem with such a misunderstanding of a two tiered system stems from the
weight of the assumption of political endorsement which goes with it.
There is a clear and reasonable purpose behind a two tier system, as well as the
general arguments of path dependency; it seems a perfectly reasonable interpretation of many
welfare programs and as such a reasonable predictor of future policy behavior. Undeniably,
by drawing a bright line in the sand based on who benefits and how they are allocated those
benefits, helps to clarify which programs carry more political and social weight in the form
of voting support. In a welfare state which is attempting to redistribute scarce resources,
particularly in tough financial environments, it would make sense that “Upper tier programs
are supposed to be favored because they serve a larger number of politically powerful
individuals” (Howard 2007, 30). However, if the line that is drawn does not accurately
capture the situation, it is much harder to make accurate politically weighted decisions
regarding support or targeted growth in specific spending sectors. In other words, the
questions of how much and for whom, are more complicated issues than are given credit in a
two tier system. In order to factor in how much and for who, it is imperative that we identify
and measure the different factors which influence the uniformity, generosity, beneficiaries
and trends of spending across different programs. In particular, authors like Suzanne Mettler
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argue that the shape of policy support falls along a continuum rather than a cluster of two
types of welfare programs with predetermined levels of support and political longevity.
In general, there is an ideal deference towards programs like Social Security and
Medicare which can deliver relatively uniform benefits across different social groups on a
national scale. Certainly some groups receive more money from social security depending on
earnings history, yet the ideas remains that “everyone effectively plays by the same rules”
(Howard 2007, 32). However, not all top tier programs are able to accomplish such broad
social insurance schemes, just as not all bottom tier programs are so limited to small
constituents of the poor. However, uniformity among programs is fairly difficult to measure
in the American context because of the unique influence of different states in determining
coverage and benefits. That being said, it is clear that while certain programs in both tiers are
limited by state distribution of services such as Medicaid, there are plenty of middle ground
programs which reside in both box that are completely nationalized and uniform in
appearance. Programs such as food stamps and unemployment insurance which “fail to
respect the boundaries of the upper and lower tiers spells trouble for theories of the two tiered
welfare state” (Howard 2007, 35). Again, this is problematic because if the lines between the
tiers are blurred, along with who is included and by what rules (i.e. how the policy is carried
out state versus nationally) they are given coverage, so too blurs the predictability of social
responsiveness to investment or cutbacks between from on tier to the other.
Another couple of important assumptions that must be challenged in the two-tier
system is whether or not upper tier programs are actually more generous than lower tier
programs as well as whether upper tier programs receive significantly more diverse and
unified support from beneficiaries than those lower tier programs? Again, there is the hint
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that along the extremes of both tiers the general theory of the system seems to remain in tack,
however significant outliers are present. In particular, Medicaid represents one means tested
program which not only bucks the trend of expectedly lower generosity in programs designed
as effective redistributive handouts but it also affects a much wider breadth of the
constituency than a majority of supposedly broader social insurance programs of the upper
tier. Specifically, Medicaid breaks barriers because it is consistently more generous per
recipient than similar social insurance programs like Medicare where the average benefit per
person is 10,000 and 6,000 dollars respectively. Further, the Medicaid benefits extend
beyond the typical poverty cliental “to families with incomes almost twice the poverty line
and pregnant women up to 133 percent of the poverty line” (Howard 2007, 38). Thus
Medicaid, a means testing program which continues to undergo expansions under legislation
like President Obama’s Affordable Care Act, almost serves the same role as those top tier
social insurance programs which are highly supported for their theoretically wider base of
beneficiaries. As for future policy implications, Howard seems to argue that those programs
which are able to broaden their beneficiary base, whether it be means testing or social
insurance, those programs “are supposed to grow faster and resist cutbacks” (Howard 2007,
40). Under this assumption, it makes sense that Medicaid would be growing at a high rate
despite the traditional belief that only life-cycle social insurance which has an inherently
broader and visible recipient base, would grow faster. This expectation was empirically dead
on, and showed that “Medicaid expanded at a remarkable rate of 14 percent every year
(between 1980 and 2000)” (Howard 2007, 40). Such startling figures help break the illusion
of a major political and social separation between the different types of programs across the
boundaries of the construction of a two-tiered system. In fact, when determining the public
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support of these programs and the political weight therein “the ratio of people wanting to
increase versus decrease spending on the poor is virtually identical to the ratio for social
security (the most popular and politically charged social insurance program within the
American welfare state)” (Howard 2007, 46).

Invisibility
In essence, the reality of the American welfare case study is personified by the
shifting shadows of different investigative lens and assumptions. Now that we have broken
down what is happening in the American welfare state, it is necessary to clarify and
reorganize the factors which may be most helpful in rooting out some generalizable themes
in the narrative of welfare policy development. For two authors in particular, Mettler and
Howard, the narrative is dominated by a concept of invisibility which aims to explain
peculiarities embedded within the welfare state such as the expansion and success of certain
programs in both tiers over the others. Additionally, both theorists use variables of visibility
and invisibility in order to explain the presence of a similar value based welfare states, like
the US and the UK, which pursue very different welfare programs with disproportionate
levels of redistribution and inequality.
However to understand these concepts of visibility which may help explain the
decision making patterns of different states it is first important to look at literature explaining
the policy process and particularly at what limits policy decision options. The principal factor
in understanding this process which captures where the power lies in policy development and
sustainability is the social constraints associated with a policy decision. These social
constraints take the form of the bargaining power of targets, which can be divided
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categorically into the sources of the support necessary to back state programs. When it comes
to welfare programs, authors and policy makers all have to factor in the effects of programs
on three distinct populations with which the programs may interact. The success of certain
programs over others is often tied to how directly or indirectly these programs are able to
impact the targets of the policy, the funders of the policy, and the general public opinion
generated from policy decisions for which the state must ultimately answer, in a
democratized welfare state.

Beneficiaries of Policy Matter
In particular, careful framing of who will benefit from a policy can be the most
important factor for determining the future success of a program. When choosing either
expansion or retrenchment, it is important to understand that the targets of a program
typically have a significant impact on the perceptions of those who financially support the
program as well as the public constituent base which ultimately judge the allocation of
spending on specific groups of individuals over others. In traditional welfare state analysis,
authors like Gosta Esping Andersen and Duane Swank push forth cultural explanations to
explain different trends in welfare targets and comprehensive policy efforts. This belief
comes into the purview of Andersen’s “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” model which
works, for all intents and purposes, as a culturally path dependent framework primarily
focused on the target of a program. In other words, some groups inherently have legitimacy
while other do not in a given welfare system and the level of expected assistance are
similarly engrained with blanket checks written against a groups societal worth. For instance,
the two polar categorical “Worlds of Welfare” show that in a “Liberal Welfare State” like the
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United States or Canada, there is bound to be less protections and resource redistribution
because of deep-seated values of individualist, winner take all institutions; while on the other
hand, the “Social Democratic Welfare States” of Scandinavia feel strongly about government
responsibilities to protect and provide for its citizens to ensure that nobody goes without
basic standards of living, education and health care. In essence, the argument is that “welfare
states are path dependent in that the cognitive and political consequences of a past policy
choices constrain and otherwise shape efforts at programmatic and systematic retrenchment”
(Swank 2005, 188).
However, at least in the American context, Christopher Howard has proved that there
are significant outliers in the form of successful programs which target the poorest segments
of American society. In other words, the evidence would suggest that even if interests are
dramatically entrenched along class structures, and the distinct level of worthiness afforded
to members of those classes, the status of a recipient is not inseparable from the financial fate
of a program. Specifically there is evidence which shows that certain programs, like the
EITC, Medicaid and Food Stamps, have grown more quickly than all “upper tier” programs.
Howard explains that the reason for this is the much hidden mechanisms through which the
American welfare state operates. In other words, the fact that the EITC works as a tax credit,
as well as guaranteed loans, makes new home ownership more affordable and accessible.
There are lots of non-institutionally recognizable program delivery mechanisms like the
EITC, which the American welfare state draws upon in relative secrecy. Further, it is the fact
that these programs are invisible that further allows them to be successful because in the
American system, Howard argues there is a reason for the assumption that “upper tier
programs are supposed to grow faster and resist cutbacks better than lower tier programs,”
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which has led to the reality of programmatic inequality between targets (Howard 2004, 40).
That reason is that the targets matter, the upper tier programs in that model are supposed to
do better off because they are giving back to more deserving targets, such as the wealthy
interest groups that make up the politically active constituency of a given community. In this
social context then, where the strength of a social insurance resiliency has been established
through visibly supporting the politically useful targets, the opposite formula of invisibility
has been invaluable to the “means tested social programs, [where] less visibility has meant
less vulnerability” (Howard 2007, 95).
The world of welfare policy development has undeniably been molded into a complex
and layered entity which is by its nature hard to see and even harder to track. This especially
true regarding the idea of making it known to the beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries
what there is to gain and what is being lost by utilizing such under the radar welfare schemes.
Suzanne Mettler finds major dissonance with an argument for institutional disengagement
from the targets of social assistance programs. The most pervasive reason is that the
invisibility reinforces the inequality of program distribution through disenfranchising the
recipient base of hidden programs. The central idea behind this visibility problem for Mettler
is that “people cannot be expected to take action to advocate for or express opposition to
policies of which they are scarcely aware,” which holds true not only for those recipients of
policies but also for the wider collective social base (Mettler 2011, 28). In fact, she argues
that the submerged state problem is dangerous for the recipients of programs because it
enforces what Mettler perceives as an unfair playing field. Instead of the traditional
assumption about welfare politics, which calls upon factors of path dependency and cultural
biases to explain the inequality within the American welfare system, Mettler identifies the
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trend that the submerged state unfairly allows for certain interests to organize, while others
cannot do so, and have no knowledge of the stakes involved. Further, it is “these
organizations representing powerful interests in the submerged state that have amplified their
political voice over time… Moreover, unlike visible policies that more readily attract group
loyalty, policies of the submerged state are typically too hidden and their status too unclear to
generate such affiliations” (Mettler 2011, 35).

Understanding Interest Groups
To reiterate, Mettler feels that one major problem in the submerged welfare state is
that it is designed to be advantageous to special interest groups with an understandable bias
towards upwardly distributive programs. In order to determine the validity of this line of
argument, we must critically look to those making the important decisions and how they are
influenced. Naturally this means looking at Congress, but generally speaking it is easier to
expand the discussion to the general legislative process since decisions at both the state and
national level may have critical impact on the shape or even realization of a program. For
Mettler, the evidence shows that the only way to undermine special interest groups and
effectively what looks like collusive policy behavior by actors like the banks, AARP, and
home builders/realtors associations which manipulate how policies are delivered is to
interrupt the current legislative process. Mettler asserts that the more visible programs are
made, as well as the more specific information available on the specific recipients of
programs, the less free interests groups will be to influence policies outside of collective
social decision making.
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In sum, Mettler finds that the legislative process is incentivized to provide benefits,
or entitlements, to those engaged in the process and able to mobilize their interests in the
form of lobbying dollars and special relationships with members of the legislative bodies.
Naturally, the poorest segments of the population are at many significant disadvantages when
it comes to mobilizing as a community. One key reason is that segments of the unemployed
or other poor population are effectively disenfranchised of a collective voice because they are
unlikely to see themselves as part of a unified community. Additionally, they cannot
mobilize a lobby effort because aside from organizational challenges, the poorest segments
of the population also do not have the resources to compete in national politics. Further,
Mettler argues that once these types of interests groups are able to establish a threshold
within the legislative process they “yield what are called policy feedback affects” (Mettler
2011, 32). Policy feedback is a term coined by theorist Paul Pierson who examines the power
of different types of actors and interests, and simply helps to explain the idea that once
established, entrenched interests create “incentives as a reward for going along…. Making
reform efforts all the more challenging and costly, both in financial and political terms”
(Mettler 2011, 32).
Mettler grounds much of these arguments regarding the “political power of interest
groups… [which] present profound challenges to reformers and imperil the success of the
legislative achievements they manage to win” upon the idea that the most important audience
of the welfare policies are the general public, who if enabled through open information, can
alter the reality of inequality in the welfare state (Mettler 2011, 36). This would of course
provoke much disagreement from the traditionalists, like Andersen, who believe that the
national values of American society would not allow for this seemingly naïve interpretation
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of the power of greater democratic participation. However, Mettler’s argument also offers
some major problems for Christopher Howard, who also argues that the secrets to
understanding the welfare state are rooted much deeper within the interplay of public
sentiment and the political process, which at times manifests programs that certainly remain
somewhat hidden from the general public and invested onlookers. However, in this way
Howard argues that the most important audience of any policy stands firmly within the
legislative process. In particular, the targets of policies are not determined by interest groups,
but instead by political actors and a scale weighing program costs versus the political
legitimacy of the target. Of course, there is no doubt that a lobby effort and political activism
can have some real world implications. Howard, for instance, cites the success of housing
subsidies, which through careful pressure on elected officials resulted in “between 1967 and
1995, the total cost of the mortgage interest deduction increasing by almost 7 percent a year,
adjusted for inflation” (Howard 1997, 144). However, the main crux of legislative success for
programs can be boiled down into two specific factors: is there a bipartisan target of the
program, and are the costs of such a program visible?
With regard to bipartisan support, Howard is basically making the claim that for a
welfare program targeting the poor not to be a “poor program,” support must be stable
enough to endure the changing of political priorities with the coming and going of different
political parties. This type of support is best categorized by the success of the EITC which
enjoyed executive backing by regimes as far apart politically as the Reagan and Clinton
administrations, under which the program experienced significant periods of expansion both
in terms of eligibility and benefits. This broad based political support can come about for
several different reasons. The first of which is creating “social policies aimed at more
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deserving recipients, such as children (Medicaid) and the working poor (EITC)” (Howard
2007, 95). Compared to Mettler’s critique of the legislative process, which found fault with
the potential for favoring special interest groups and subsequently upwardly distributive
policies, Howard offers a much kinder explanation: the legislative process gives deference to
politically credible targets and the organized will of middle class beneficiaries that often
make up these interest groups like the AARP, and can easily be portrayed as more politically
legitimate than the unemployed.
One major mistake of the American welfare experience, according to Howard, is that
it has a habit of creating negative connotations associated with such forms of government
spending. For example, in the 1960’s the “War on Poverty promoted racial equality… [and in
doing so] created a backlash against the welfare state” (Howard 2007, 94). However, just
because a program is seemingly well intentioned and framed as a unique program which may
escape the negative “social handout” biases associated with welfare programs, there is no
guarantee of safety. The second way that a program can obtain support is by imbedding itself
in the legislative process of congressional politics. Particularly, this form of support
gathering is most successful in the presence of a divided government. One clear example of
this is when President George H. W. Bush supported and defended the expansion of EITC
and Medicaid “in order to win over some Democrats in order to pass their (the Republican)
budgets” (Howard 2007, 101). Often this political give and take occurs in the form of “key
provisions tucked away in massive, complicated bills” (Howard 2007, 101). Such a process is
more commonly recognized as one of author Jacob Hacker’s four-pronged policy map, under
the term “policy layering,” which is the phenomenon of surreptitiously embedding an
existing policy with add-ons and reconciliation acts rather than a formal and visible overhaul.
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This form, as well as the other forms of “under the surface reforms,” which
transitions the successful policy development from Howard’s first standard to the second,
where the key to success is determined by the visibility inherent within the costs of the
welfare programs (Hacker 2004, 246). In particular, programs that are traditionally found in
what most traditional welfare analysts call the lower tier of social assistance programs which
are supposed to face the most vulnerability because they are programs which are limited both
in scope of public support and feasible visibility. This is an erroneous assumption according
to the likes of Howard, who suggests that policies are most successful when they are
embedded in the legislative process because it creates a lesser burden of constituent support
and thus lower exposure to public scrutiny and legitimacy as a use of government funds.
Such logic can be used to explain the continued political support of means tested programs,
despite the “pejorative connotations of policies targeted to recipients they perceive as
undeserving” (Mettler 2011, 40) In other words, the limited exposure of a program can
sometimes make up for the deservingness of a target, but taken together the level of
bipartisan support garnered through target credibility as well as the visibility of costs of the
program to the general public helps to explain why “one can find examples of political
success and political failure” (Howard 2007, 106) in both tiers. The key then for Howard can
be found when there are less publicly powerful defined targets of a program such as children,
or the unemployed. In these situations, legislative actors must utilize a policy program where
the costs are less visible in order to deliver social assistance where it is most needed.
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When do the stakeholders get a say?
Unfortunately, looking to the Mettler and Howard models of welfare assessment,
there seems to be a stark lack of public consensus building and will formation within the
American welfare state. Yet, this is not a particularly uncommon assertion within the
literature. In particular the recent book authored by Benjamin Page and Lawrence Jacobs,
“Class War,” further accuses the political process within the United States of purposefully
distracting the constituent base along racial and moral motivations rather than issues of
inequality. The idea is that there is fostered political passivity in certain areas of public
discourse. However, specifically for the success of future social assistance programs targeted
at the margins of society, the rub of the submerged state’s invisibility is a major problem for
Mettler and needs to be rectified, while at the same time a saving grace for Howard, who
argues that the process should just be left alone. Howard, it should be said, concedes that
there is significant levels of inequality in the United States but assumes as a juxtaposition to
Mettler that an increase in visibility would only lead to greater inequality and it is only the
lack of such visibility that allows the political parties to do the right thing and provide at least
some redistributive programs to politically less deserving or less powerful recipients.
For Suzanne Mettler on the other hand, the driving force of her theory says that the
invisibility of the policy process obstructs the ability of the American citizens to have their
say. In particular she reasserts “the idea that public policies should reflect the will of the
majority of citizens” (Mettler 2011, 67). Further, if you remember back to the Andersen
model he is saying more or less the same thing based on his idea that national values are the
driving force of policies. However, Mettler sees this relationship as being prevented from
taking place which has allowed the narrow organized interest groups discussed above to
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cement their distribution initiatives and policy support. If this is true then the submerged state
is designed to prevent public discourse and block national value preferences in policy
decision making. However, this would only be meaningful for Mettler if she is correct in
assuming that the current invisibility has led to the neglect and mistreatment of the
beneficiaries at the margins of the market economy who would theoretically receive more
benefits with more visibility and public support. This might not necessarily be the case
according to Howard who claims that there is a sort of obstructive invisibility within the
policy decision making process, but that that invisibility benefits the marginalized
communities more than if there was greater transparency of programs and recipients. Namely
because in the liberal value context, social assistance is most often given a pejorative context
and most recipients who receive them, particularly men in the working years of their lives are
seen as delinquents of the system, and as such would not be likely to garner more assistance
when left to the mercy of public opinion and discourse. In other words establishing values
can be seen as the most important determining factor of how and why assistance distribution
is allocated the way it is among all authors and literatures and as such will be a major focal
point of my study.

State of the Literature
In sum, there seems to be deviation amongst the policy packages being pursued by
these facially similar liberal welfare states and how theorists explain why those results are
happening. So in order to capture why developed economies in the liberal welfare state
facing similar socio-economic constraints, like resources available for redistribution during a
crisis, may choose to engage in such different policy output options regarding targeted social
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assistance to a growing population of high youth unemployment; the purpose of this study
will be to critically examine whether the divergence in state support spending is real, and in
particular, why some states are spending more rather than less in reaction this group of
unemployed youth emerging out of the major financial crisis of 2008. This goal outlines my
basic research design and desire to identify a clearer explanatory model of changing policy
trends of the liberal welfare regimes, but before I can test these models forwarded by the
literatures spearheaded by Gosta Esping Andersen and Suzanne Mettler, I must first elaborate
on how I have chosen to define and operationalize their models within my research design.
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Chapter 2: Theory and Methods
The United States, along with the rest of the world, finds itself facing major economic
challenges in the wake of the stagnant recovery from the 2008 financial crisis. Furthermore,
in the aftermath of this major recession, specific communities have found themselves at risk
or in need of targeted social assistance. In particular, growing populations of unemployed
and underemployed youth have begun to experience hard times as the new and growing
marginalized community throughout the variety of different systems of welfare distribution.
However, the cluster of liberal welfare regimes, as described by Gosta Esping Andersen, in
theory offer the most problematic and vulnerable situation for this community because of the
assumed national values of market competition and self-reliance. This paper aims to critically
look at this conventional wisdom about the motivations and key factors at play in welfare
policy development within two liberal welfare regimes the United States and the United
Kingdom. The research goal will be to understand how these welfare systems react to the
growing at-risk group of unemployed youth in the aftermath of a major global economic
meltdown. I will do this by framing the welfare institutions of the United States and the
United Kingdom through two competing models of analysis, one formed primarily from the
traditional factors enumerated by Andersen, and the other, stemming from more complex
dynamic model based on the work of Suzanne Mettler.
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Chart 1.1 Andersen Model of the Welfare State
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Above in Chart 1.1, we see what is the basic framework traditional theorists such as
Andersen use to explain the different pattern trends among his three distinct models of
welfare policy behavior. In particular, he argues that the distinguishing factor between his
models of behavior is the divergence between different sets of national values which in his
mind initially bifurcate along preferences regarding de-commodification and marketization
within the welfare state. For the liberal welfare states, including the United States and United
Kingdom, their national values orient themselves in a market centric way. As such, Andersen
asserts that this society is more individualistic at its core and inherently stingier with regard
to offering greater social assistance under any conditions. This is important because it means
that these liberal states are more sensitive to the economic constraints of state governments
during a recession whom are working to reconcile the call for austerity measures and the
cutting back of government spending, even in the face of growing socio-economic needs
from at risk individuals. Further, Andersen goes on defining and comparing the particular
national values of a society as the key determinant of policy patterns, where these values1 are
1

Values are used in reference to national values representing aggregate opinions rather than sup groups of the
population.
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regarding particular views of program legitimacy. The importance of capturing such values
as the independent variable is understandable in this case because it should follow that in an
advanced democratic state policy, decisions are checked through public opinions and values
which mirror national values.
Moving forward in the causal chain above then, it is clear that the idea of political
support within the legislature for the aid provided by programs is a mere function of the
national values. When these national values of program legitimation are funneled through the
second tier of the chain however, they take on a different identity. They become conceptually
similar to what Habbermas and contemporary authors such as Ingraham and Schneider call
“legitimation rationales which justify the agenda, policy goals, selection of target populations
and the tools chosen” (Ingraham and Schneider 1993, 339). Once this process is established,
deciphering what those original national values were is very important to public officials
because “they find it to their advantage to provide beneficial policies to the advantaged
groups who are both powerful and positively constructed as deserving because not only will
the group itself respond favorably but others will approve of the of the beneficial policies
being conferred on deserving people. Similarly, public officials commonly inflict punishment
on (in the case of social assistance punishment usually means neglect) negatively construed
groups who have little or no power, because they need fear no electoral retaliation from the
group itself and the general public approves of punishment for groups that it has constructed
negatively” (Ingraham and Schneider 1993, 336). These values are limited in the Andersen
model of the welfare state however, where rather than ideas of appeasing the powerful and
neglecting the weak, Andersen believes all policy decisions are legitimized based on a much
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simpler and value based rationale which clusters different patterns of targets and levels of
appropriate spending into his three worlds of welfare.
Andersen predicts that in the final chain of analysis, the shape of welfare policy will
be applied universally to the in-need population based on basic qualifications determined by
these compounded national values which have been refracted through the legislative process
and churned out specific policy trends of specific spending platforms. For the liberal welfare
state such trends are assumed to only provide benefits to those individuals unable to compete
in the market or are otherwise temporarily marginalized by forces beyond their control.
Additionally, the nature of such rationales and targets of policies are likely to be reentrenching over time because the distribution of power and social constructions of who is
deserving tend to be influenced by the past national values and policy decisions. This is the
phenomenon that Andersen and many other analysts call path dependency, which for all
intents and purposes closes off the model as a self-perpetuating process. This is because for
Andersen national values are seen as constant and reliable identifiers for these states.
Specifically for the United States and the United Kingdom, this model is meant to predict
similar policy behavior based on shared liberal values which distribute assistance which will
only possess marginally redistributive. Thus, the expected reinforcing identity of the liberal
welfare state is supposed to provide for only minimal forms of standard of living protections
to state dependents and other delinquents of the market economy. These assertions do not
bode particularly well for the unemployed youth of the western Anglo-Saxon countries that
make up the cluster of Liberal welfare states; however there is an assumption that there will
be assistance provided and that any assistance available will be narrowly distributed to those
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groups which have failed to provide the basic necessities of life for themselves like food and
shelter, more or less free from other potentially mitigating factors such as race or age.

Mettler:
Naturally, in the world of policy development and analysis Andersen does not possess
the only lens with which we may observe the problem. Additionally, it is unsurprising that
Mettler finds issues with Andersen’s framework which he uses as a key to explaining policy
trends from the past, present and future. Instead Mettler argues there is much more going on
than meets the eye (quite literally).

Chart 2.1: Mettler Model of Welfare State
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Most notably, Mettler supplants the motivating independent variable of national values
for “organized narrow interests.” This is because for many authors, including Suzanne
Mettler, Cristopher Howard, Benjamin Page, Lawrence Jacobs, and Jacob Hacker, the social
assistance being provided is not being done according to national values and opinions. This
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position is based on numerous surveys and public opinion data which attempts to get at
determining these national values as they relate to preferences in the shape and distribution of
social assistance in the American society. There is a significant level of data in the United
States which shows that the shape of assistance given is in fact upwardly distributed and the
primary recipients are not, as Andersen asserts, marginalized state dependents relying on
social welfare expenditures. This is in violation of what Jürgen Habbermas describes as a
legitimation crisis “where modern governments must explain why democracies concentrate
wealth and power” more generally in society (Ingraham and Schneider 1993, 339) which is
supposed to check the government’s power to distribute unequally or not in accordance with
national values. Mettler argues that this happens because of an invisible policy process in the
United States. Further, greater program visibility and an adherence to the policy legitimation
helps explain why the shape of assistance distribution appears to be quite different in the
United Kingdom where the distribution patterns, while still not generous compared to other
welfare states, are much more neutrally and universally distributed along qualifications of
need. The primary explanation for this phenomenon, indicated by theorists in Mettler’s camp,
believe the legislative process, specifically in the United States, is being steered away from
genuine collective decision making. In fact, genuine collective decision making in the public,
as Mettler defines it through extensive survey data, with surveys offering specific program
data, is indicated as being more egalitarian in nature than conventionally understood and that
general cultural assumptions of pure market dependency and conservative individualism are
not quite accurate. In other words, one reason that Mettler finds particular issue with the
model as outlined by Andersen is that national values, the primary factor for explaining
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welfare state behavior in Andersen’s theory, are not verified in her survey data showing
instead that those values move in the opposite direction expected in Andersen’s model.
Mettler blames the policy differences on what she labels as an invisible policy process in
her most recent book, “The Submerged State.” The invisible policy structure she finds fault
with is what she defines as a lack of direct and visible connections between programs and the
government institutions that support them. This is particularly problematic because, to her,
the creation of invisible programs with hidden recipients flies in the very face of social
consensus and the ability for individuals to assert their opinions on target legitimacy before
those values are turned into legislative initiatives. Additionally, this is problematic because
this interruption of national values regarding target legitimacy and popular opinion of
programs appears to be a reinforcing one. Many authors (Hacker 2004; Handler 2004; Korpi
2003; Piven and Cloward 1979) note that special interests, upon achieving a threshold in the
political process, are able to block attempts to effect change which undermines those
entrenched interests. In other words, it is merely those organized interests which are feeding
into the legislative process and with the help of invisible legislative tools, such as tax credits
and publicly mandated private expenditures rather than explicit social insurance handouts;
those interests are able to prevent unwanted challenges from the greater society at large. The
independent variable of an invisible policy process helps perpetuate the organized narrow
interests while at the same time working to promulgate what Mettler calls political passivity.
In this way the invisible policy process may be seen as a process of obstruction which works
congruently with the other independent variable, organized narrow interests, in order to
determine the outcomes of in the dependent variable of policy outcomes which violate
egalitarian national values.
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Political passivity is a measure of social participation and will formation, either in
affirmation of or in opposition to specific legislative decisions. For Mettler, the political
engagement of individuals or groups with regard to their awareness and ability to support or
oppose a policy is severely hampered by entrenched policies preserved by an organized few
and the majority of people have become politically passive because of the obstructive
invisibility within the policy process leaving a lack of information or evidence available to
indicate that a legislative decision has been made. She believes that it is these factors together
which project political passivity on society and diminish the perceived need to organize or
mobilize in support of specific values. Thus, for Mettler, there will be a perceivable
difference between the United States and the United Kingdom because the levels of policy
visibility between the two countries are drastically different with the U.K. employing more
visible legislative tools than U.S. counterparts. As such, there should be far less discrepancy
between the picture of United Kingdom policy behavior when framed by both the Andersen
and Mettler lenses than is hypothesized to appear in the American welfare state.
Mettler, as well as other contemporary welfare observers, suggest that the disconnect
between welfare states with similar national values and yet differing observed distributions of
social assistance, in the end boils down to policy tools with varying levels of visibility being
utilized to carry out the specific goals of a few rather than an engaged populous with
structured values determining who should have resources as they are being redistributed.
In other words, the welfare states of the U.S. and the U.K. have found themselves at a
critical decision point in relation to extending their social commitments of targeted protection
to an unprecedented group of under-30 unemployment in terms of developing policies of
exclusionary retrenchment versus inclusive expansion. In essence, the scenery of these
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welfare regimes are changing during this economic crisis and, these models will help
determine if this change also means diverging away from each other regarding policy output
and the differing levels and types of state support offered. This change however, comes at a
crucial moment as American and British welfare states find themselves facing a new class of
welfare program consumers in the form of surging youth unemployment rates. This means
that the decisions welfare states are currently making regarding the level of state based
support, as a function of state spending, will have crucial impacts on the future of this group
and future impact they may have on each country’s economy. This is clearly an important
historical juncture for the welfare state because radically high levels of youth unemployment
will threaten the very fabric of their economies as well as risk the balance of their societies.

Methods:
Taking into account my question: How will the liberal welfare regimes of the United
States and United Kingdom respond to growing youth unemployment according to two
opposing models of policy behavior? It is clear that I am essentially drawing a comparative
framework around differing public policy trends and the potentially similar or different social
movements that are driving them. Based on that notion, I have chosen to utilize a
combination of two different, non-experimental research designs in order to observe the
validity and reliability of these hypotheses. The primary tool I will be using is a comparative
case study analysis. This plan of action is primarily guided by the teachings of Eric
Moskowitz, professor at the College of Wooster, and Robert Yin, an expert in the use of case
study research. Moskowitz said in a 2013 lecture that case studies are incredibly useful when
trying to understand why some complex phenomena are taking place (2013). In this context,
there are very few social phenomena that are more complex than changing state behaviors.
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Yin further described using case studies as a tool to “explain the process of how and why
something happens” (Yin 2009). This is precisely the goal of the stated research question
above. So this design feeds naturally into the stated needs and goals of this study where I will
be comparing the cases of the United States and the United Kingdom. The reasoning behind
this selection is based heavily on the ideas of the method of agreement approach to case
selection where the US and the UK, according to data from the OEDC and the International
Labor Organization, have approximately the same conditions in terms high levels of youth
unemployment with starkly different spending characteristics. The variables at play being:
similar GDP per capita; similar levels of youth unemployment at approximately 23 and 21
percent respectively; similar state capacity to pay in the form of expenditures relative to total
population; and most importantly similar liberal values. Under most circumstances it would
make sense that with all these similar variables the policy outcome would be the same which
is the traditional hypothesis of the Andersen model presented above in Chart 1.1. However,
there is a major section of the literature which finds faults with the determining variable of
Andersen’s model and asserts other variables are at play which with force different outcomes
between the otherwise similar states.
However, because this research is being conducted through an explanatory case study
method, Robert Yin points out that there may be some issues with internal validity “if the
investigator incorrectly concludes that there is a causal relationship between x and y” (Yin
2009). Perhaps a more serious obstacle to the use of the comparative case studies is the
challenge of generalizing the findings of a case study design across new cases with external
validity. This is what Yin describes in his book, “Case Study Research: Design and
Methods,” as the “major barrier in doing case studies,” because without a careful design the
Page | 48

results will “provide a poor basis for generalizing” (2009). In response to this claim, I see the
generalizability of this study to be fairly strong within narrow construction of testing policy
behavior models within welfare states in my study. Further, the narrow scope of the research
pertains only to the specific spending choices made by welfare regimes within the
circumstances of a major financial recession and high levels of youth unemployment.
Before trying to understand where the welfare regimes of the United States and United
Kingdom are moving, with the with the help of different theoretical works discussing how
these changes are likely to occur, I must first clarify how each of my variables is going to be
measured within my hypothesized causal chains.

Chart 1.2: Andersen Model Causal Diagram
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Conceptually moving linearly from left to right along this chain, my independent variable is
what Andersen refers to as National Values. In the world of social research, values are a
common and key tool for understanding policy motivations and state behavior in democratic
states. These values are most often accessed through national polling data asking specific
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questions which allow a separation between the policy process and the values that are
supposed to feed into them. The national polling data, conducted by different authors, while
only partially available within the findings they have published along with their work can be
similarly accessed in the United States and the United Kingdom by mass poling compilation
services and research institutions such as the Roper I-Poll database, National Opinion
Research Center, Congressional Research Service all focusing on the United States and
Polling the Nations database, National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes
Survey focusing on the United Kingdom. These questions will be able to display the
direction of general social preferences for different types of social assistance and restrictions
on social assistance will give an indication to the accuracy of Andersen’s predictions of
finding liberal national values. In sum, the results of these questions will help determine
primarily whether the values of the United States and the United Kingdom are indeed similar
and secondly the answers will help determine the presence of liberal values in either case
selected. Liberal answers would show social preferences, as Andersen predicts above,
creating limitations when given spending options as a part of the desire to cut spending and
only support those individuals whom are being failed by the market, despite efforts to engage
in the workforce. Such values are individualistic and do not see welfare spending as a high
priority and only something that should be extended to elderly, children, disabled and
generally those who cannot possibly work and provide for themselves, but also do not wish
to give limitlessly for fear of creating dependency on state support. In general, liberal welfare
values are considered to be stingy and always wish to defer to the market and offer short term
assistance when absolutely necessary.
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This wealth of data can be used to test the assumptions of national values and then test if
the legislative intent and legislative output reflects these values as Andersen would expect in
these liberal welfare regimes with stingy market oriented policy decisions. Because the
intervening variable is process oriented, the best way to get at political support is to look
carefully at the ongoing legislative discourse surrounding specific welfare policy
development and policy platforms in order to ascertain whether the countries respective
legislature is indeed invoking the national values within their policy decisions as they are
supposed to in this model. The best way to pick up on this legislative discourse is to do a
basic thematic content analysis of the media coverage of the different political parties’ policy
platforms. Andersen’s model predicts mirrored themes of liberal values to appear entrenched
in the language of the policy platforms. Such appearances for these different words and
values like dependency and limitations to spending would show a high frequency of
pejorative associations with welfare programs. Additionally, Andersen would not expect
indications of major interests groups or organizations to be mentioned or otherwise be able to
isolate pressure on certain outcomes. In particular, this will be accessible through the careful
review of the political discourse in the media looking to sources like the New York Times,
The Guardian, The BBC, and The Washington Post which will lend high internal validity
within the narrow measurement of this aspect of the policy making process.
Finally, measuring the outcome of social assistance provided simply looks to the results
of programs primarily in the form of distributive welfare dollars and the shape of program
assistance in terms of the funds allocated to the specific group that I have referred to as the
new marginalized community of unemployed youth in my study. In order to accurately assess
the amount of social assistance provided to this community, I will be examining percentage
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of the youth population that is unemployed where youth is defined by the portion of the labor
force that is 24 years old or younger and the level of assistance that is provided to this group
per capita. The idea for narrowing my age group in this manner was informed by David Bell
and David Blanchflower and their article “Youth Unemployment: Déjà vu,” which finds
being unemployed during this time in the working life (between the age of entering and 30) is
so detrimental to the individuals value and future job prospects that it creates a further burden
of dependency on the welfare programs available. However, just seeing how much of the
welfare assistance pie is going to this group is not quite enough to accurately understand
what the policy intent and pattern of assistance within a given welfare state. For that reason, I
have also chosen to look closely at any aid given to this community through a few more
lenses. For instance, it will be important to break down, to the best of my ability, the
demographic of who the recipients of aid in this cluster of unemployment are across
categories of age, race, and class to see if either state is particularly more generous to specific
subsets of this target population. Another important way to measure the extent of aid given to
this group, aside from dollars per capita, is measuring the percent of individuals within this
group of youth unemployment which is covered by the aid, in order to determine if one
country covers more people with less aid or conversely less people with more aid. Such a
measure would add a great deal of dynamism to understanding the overall generosity or
stinginess of a set of policies. Finally, aside from aid dollars it is important to also look at the
types and versatility of programs and assistance dispersed by a set of policies. For instance
more compressive sets of programs to help address the need for assistance would show
greater generous intent than a larger one-off aid injection program.
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In other words, this model looks to use poll data to ascertain values of the society
which presumably do not change in this model, and as such, continually feed into and
perpetuate a path dependent legislative pattern within the given welfare states which churn
out expected policy coverage based on those national values and is measurable by the level
of assistance provided.

Page | 53

Chart 2.2: Mettler Model Causal Diagram
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Of course, it is evident immediately that this causal formulation is more complex and
has two converging independent variables which are significantly different than the
aforementioned national values used by Andersen in his model. Again, moving conceptually
from left to right, and beginning with “organized narrow interests.” These interests are what
theorists like Mettler believe are interjecting in Andersen’s model and what eventually are
being represented and supported in the legislative decision making process. In order to tease
out the presence of such interests, authors have most often relied on measuring lobby monies,
and group influence and ability to access key policy decision makers and potentially provide
input on specific policy decisions. Based on the need to look at the decision process as it is
ongoing, this study will dichotomously measure the both the presence and power of these
different interest groups in both of the traditional areas of influence. The findings will help
determine which, if any, groups or interests have greater access to influencing policy
outcomes than others. If Mettler is correct in her assumptions then there should be little to no
access for labor organizations and any other groups of lesser resources which are not
expected to receive benefits in her model. Such findings would offer the greatest indicator
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that Mettler’s model is capturing a key aspect of the explanatory relationship determining
how and why social assistance is distributed to certain targets.
Determining the presence of interests which have the power to alter the expected
distribution of social assistance within the welfare state is of major concern to any theorist
testing the behavioral model forwarded by the likes of Suzanne Metter and Christopher
Howard as represented in their books “The Submerged State” and “The Welfare State
Nobody Knows” respectively. Yet an additional aspect of such collusive interests is
concurrently dependent on their invisibility which is defined to be the lack of direct and
visible connections between programs and the government institutions that support them.
This is important because these authors assert the idea that when sufficient information about
policy decisions and their consequences are exposed to public discourse, those interests are
not likely to be able to defend their positions and outcomes will change so as to be in keeping
with national values. These questions appear as questions of participation such as: have you
or anyone you know received public assistance such as unemployment, food stamps or any
other government funded aid? Additionally she asks questions of value with before and after
aspects, determining levels of support for programs initially, as compared to after receiving
specific information about who those programs serve and how they function. Based on these
answers, Mettler defines certain programs as highly invisible while others are not. She argues
that the invisible programs in the system outnumber the visible ones and hide the true
distribution of social assistance nearly in its entirety, relying on a few visible programs to
distract and obstruct the necessary information required for public protest and mobilization in
opposition of unequal and upwardly distributive trends. As such, the measurement of such
invisibility is crucial and, for the most part, observed in the results of which programs are
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supported and which are not. Consequently, my study will be utilizing a combination of the
data Mettler generated in her own survey research, which asked individuals about their
experience within welfare programs in order to ascertain what their perceived benefits were,
in tandem with similar survey research conducted by mass poling databases in the United
States and the United Kingdom to determine the environment of invisibility present in either
case. Her criteria of invisibility looks to a combination of administrative tools and delivery
tools, where the administrative invisibility entails limited discourse which fails to alter or
amend programs that do not conform to national values but rather are situated to better suit
changing special interests rather than establishing new policies. On the policy delivery side
of invisibility, she looks to lack of clarity within the programs themselves which either
prevents people from accessing the assistance or knowing that the assistance is targeted to
them and provided through government legislation.
The poster child of both administrative and delivery invisibility, which on the whole
hides the nature of programs, and in doing so hides the true recipients, is the home mortgage
interest deduction program. The reason for this is “on the rare occasion when policymakers
ever talk the HMID, they typically convey the impression that it helps make home-ownership
possible for middle income people” (Mettler 2011, 23). Further the HMID has been protected
by well-organized and resource heavy home builders and realtor associations which have
worked to expand the coverage of the HMID to 1,000,000 dollars, meaning that the
associated recipients are often the more wealthy which use the tax deduction to purchase
more expensive homes and inflate prices of the housing market, making home ownership to
those on the cusp and in need of assistance insufficiently able to purchase a home. The
HMID offers an example of one such administrative method of invisibility which funnels
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resources and assistance away from those who need it and by accordance of egalitarian
national values deserve it. Further, invisible delivery mechanisms make it difficult to
ascertain that the government is responsible for the assistance provided, and as such, when it
is unequally distributed to the most-wealthy and exacerbates inequality. However, there is no
opposition or dissent among the public who would not support such allocations as a part of
the values. The poster child of this type of policy is often any publicly mandated private
expenditure which is given tax exempt status such as retirement benefits and health insurance
benefit exemptions. Such programs allows the government to distribute assistance to
beneficiaries in a more complex and convoluted way then direct social expenditures which
has the added benefit for the submerged state and organized narrow interests of hiding
exactly who the major beneficiaries are and how much they are receiving. Such policy
patterns can be used to make important determinations. The data available from these recent
studies, as well as the data compiled from the Roper I-Poll and the Polling the Nations
databases, will clarify whether this invisible policy process is in fact driving passivity, a lack
of efficacy, obstacles to organization and mobilization and finally driving policies which
violate the more egalitarian values Mettler argues is being actively suppressed. Further, that
data will help establish the level of invisibility present within the overall policy process
where more invisible programs will be noticeable by the gap between actual spending
distributions and socially desired distributions.
This survey data has been further used to observe and measure the intervening
variable of political passivity in Mettler’s model. In particular, the term political passivity,
which is coined by Mettler, is essentially an extension of the invisible policy process which
measures the lack of public will formation, either in support or opposition of programs. In
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essence then political passivity, for Mettler, is used to explain how the invisible policy
process acts to generate passive behavior within the groups of marginalized recipients not
receiving their fair share of assistance and the general public which are supposed to hold the
legislative process accountable to their collective social values of distribution.
Resulting patterns within what Mettler calls political passivity are therefore tricky to
capture because strong negative opinions about the current distribution of social assistance
were suppressed by the invisible policy process. In other words, the invisible policy process
for Mettler is an obstructive force which fosters passivity out of a lack of information rather
than a lack efficacy or perceived ability to change the results. In fact, Mettler argues that
when this obstruction fails the public will not be passive and will change the results. In order
to test which phenomena is at play, my study will utilize a content analysis in the media of
organized efforts of dissent by organized groups of the at-risk communities like groups of
unemployed youth. These displays of public dissent and civil disruption are going to be
isolated for frequency in terms of the number of events and size in terms of the number of
participants in an ordinal ranking, because different protests may carry more weight and
pressure and the difference between events cannot be considered comparable as it would be if
it were an interval measurement. The data for this ordinal measurement will be collected
through a meta-search of media coverage of youth displays of public disruptions and protest
in EBSCOhost. Mettler would of course expect there to be low frequencies of dissent where
there are higher levels of invisibility and by association greater public passivity. Conversely,
Mettler would expect where there is greater visibility of programs, ignoring or otherwise
failing to adequately provide at-risk individuals with social assistance, the more likely they

Page | 58

will be able to mobilize opposition and put pressure on media to acknowledge and spread
their position on the policy discourse.
With regard to the dependent variable in this behavioral map, Mettler focuses on the
disparity of what assistance is actually being provided versus what assistance should be
provided without the obstructive invisible policy process and reinforced public passivity.
Mettler captures this gap through a summation of the distribution of social assistance to
groups of recipients as a percentage of total social expenditures distributed, and how it
matches up with the survey data which tells her what the national values determine the
distribution of resources should look like. As for capturing both of these measures: what
policies are providing and what they normatively should provide according to Mettler’s
egalitarian national values, in my study I will first rely on the measurements used to capture
the social assistance provided in the Andersen model. Those measures were aligned along the
trending amount of assistance per capita distributed to the >24 unemployment population;
how those assistance dollars are distributed; what percentage of the under 24 unemployed are
being covered; what different types of assistance programs are available. Next, my study will
capture the normative distribution based on aggregated perceptions captured within the
national values surveys utilized by Mettler who asks questions of program support before and
after full information is made available. Mettler expects to see a gap between what is done
and what she perceives should be done when there is greater visibility and information
transparency in the policy process. She believes that such a gap, which holds greater disparity
in relation to the pervasiveness of intrusive narrow interests, further perpetuated by an
invisible policy process and reinforced by a certain level of public passivity, is the best way
to measure and identify policies in violation of true national values. Hence, this variable is a
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bivariate nominal analysis about whether the real distribution is in keeping with national
values or conversely in violation of these values. The real distribution can only be
determined through looking at trends of distribution and patterns of expansion versus
retrenchment of assistance as it is provided to specific profiles of targets. The normative
distribution will have to rely again on categorical survey data which measures the
deservingness of certain targets of policies and how much they should receive. Determining
whether or not these two measurements and spending patterns match will, according to
Mettler, provide the clearest indication of what kind of welfare policy response the United
States and United Kingdom will have towards a growing population of unemployed people
under the age of thirty in the aftermath of a global economic recession. The expected results
for a successful Mettler model would show a larger gap for the United States who spends less
than it should according to less public participation as a product of an invisible policy
process. Additionally, she asserts that the United Kingdom, because of greater visibility and
public participation, will be more satisfied with spending patterns and the gap will be much
smaller.
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Chapter 3: United Kingdom Case
Study
Part 1: Introduction to the UK Case Study
It is clear at least that policy development, and in general, social policies that are
pursued by different governments can be seen as a sort of strategy or plan of action to
accomplish a certain and specific outcome which policy makers would deem as a social
improvement. Because the function of a policy is to affect social benefits through either a
measurable adjustment to the status quo or conversely an attempt to maintain the status quo
within a changing environment or circumstances, it is therefore important to understand the
general patterns of policies and strategies that have been pursued in order to understand the
likely goals of the state. These evolving goals which are intended to address the ever
changing social needs of the state helps to better encapsulate major trends in their reactions
to times of high social need and interruptions in the status quo, like a global financial
recession. Specifically, major interruptions in the economy such as the world experienced in
the most recent recession is a shock to labor market conditions and as such has marginalized
individuals who are most at risk within the labor market. In other words, states have to deal
with large influxes of state dependent unemployed citizens of all ages, economic classes and
races. Historically for both the United Kingdom and the United States, such downturns and
shocks to the labor market are not new instances as both countries experienced fairly major
instances of unemployment as recently as the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Indeed, almost all
protections and government run labor insurance programs including unemployment
insurance and wage subsidies, have their origin in times of major economic risk when the
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policy needs of those marginalized groups of jobless individuals were high. Later, similar
benefits where extended to those individuals who cannot compete for themselves such as
disability insurance.
In particular, the European Welfare regimes grew largely out of major economic
crashes post World War I in the 1930’s and again after World War II with major
infrastructural restraints on economic growth. These original projects of risk protection were
designed around promoting labor intensive economies and Keynesian models which held
maximizing employment as a tool for maximizing production as the primary goal. However,
as John Hills notes in his historical analysis of changing aspects of the UK welfare regime as
it has occurred since the oil crisis in 1980 and the beginning of the Thatcher admiration’s
“roll back” of the welfare state, Hills notes that the reality of the UK welfare state had shifted
so that “provision for the older population through health care and pensions becomes more
important, and that for the working-age population becomes less generous and more
residualized” (Hills 2011, 606).
On that note, Hills identified two key characteristics within the types of assistance
being provided within the UK policy framework, both of which were designed around the
basic functioning of the free market and market competition. The primary spending agenda
which Hills identified were what is commonly referred to as life-cycle redistributions which
allows for “cash and in-kind provision at times in people’s lives when market activities are
low” (Hills 2011, 590). The other main form of assistance comes in the form of risk
insurance which Hills defines as “protection against loss of income in events such as
unemployment, ill health… and provision of services if needs for health or other care occurs”
(Hills 2011, 290). In general, these types of spending initiatives which were centered on
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market protections for those who can’t compete, finds its history after Thatcher notably went
to war with the public sector unions in the so called “winter of discontent”2 which marked a
transition towards a modern and more conservative attitude towards the social assistance
provided by the state including subsidized industry and wage subsidies. Note, however, that
despite any attempts to restrain public social spending, primarily instigated by the Thatcher
administration, “overall welfare activity has grown by more than 150 percent in real terms
between 1979 and 2008 from the equivalent of 34 percent to 42 percent of GDP” after
accounting for inflation (Hills 2011, 605). These different accounts of what has happened
within the Welfare state should tell you that the reality of public spending is not always clear.
In order to capture why and how government assistance has increased over the past
several decades it seems necessary to look at times of economic recession and growth alike.
Additionally, the Labor Force Survey was founded in 1992 which offers much of the indepth information collected and used by institutions such as the Office of National Statistics
to look at the make-up of employment trends and welfare recipients.

2

The common term coined by historians for the winter of public service strikes including trash collectors, public
transport and so on.
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Table1: UK Unemployment Figures
Year

Avg %unemployed
18-24

Avg %Unemployed
25-49

1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2011
2012

16.3
16.4
14.4
12
10.6
10.5
10.3
11.1
13.1
17.8
18.7
19.1

8.7
8.1
6.9
5.1
4.3
4.1
3.5
4.1
4.2
6.3
6.3
6.2

Avg. %
difference
Column 1
–2
7.6
8.3
7.5
6.9
6.3
6.4
6.8
7
8.9
11.5
12.4
12.9

Column 1 % of
total
unemployment
25
23.9
22.7
22.8
22.4
23.8
26.2
27.7
31.4
n/a
n/a
n/a

Source: ONS. 2010. “Publications.” Office for National Statistics.
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/index.html (January 25, 2014).

Table 1 covers the span of 20 years and serves a baseline to understanding not only the
legislative context but also gives context that syncs up with historical information and allows
for a more comprehensive understanding of what the labor market trends have looked like
through trends of recession and expansion. For starters, economic historians such as David
Blanchflower and David Bell isolate the common knowledge that the labor market works just
as the economy and goes through similar trends as the boom and bust cycle. However,
according to their article, “youth unemployment first became a serious problem for
industrialized countries during the 1980’s”(Bell and Blanchflower 2010, 2). The Labor Force
Survey does not provide explicit data to analyze the unemployment rates so explicitly by age
groups during that time. However, looking to the historical context of the UK at that time
would show that in the winter of 19793 we can see that major strikes were occurring in
almost every public sector industry and that historic winter has since been dubbed “the winter
3

The same year that Margret Thatcher took office as the Conservative Prime Minster
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of discontent”(“BBC - History : British History Timeline” 2014). Additionally, in 1982 one
of the great recessions hit the UK after Thatcher took on unions and privatized major
industries including “British Steel, British Telecom, the electricity-generating industry and
the water companies” (“BBC - History : British History Timeline” 2014). Fast forward to the
1990’s and table 1, above, shows that unemployment levels across the board are rather high,
and indeed, 1992 was strife with major economic uncertainty with the pound sterling being
withdrawn from the Euro pegging taking place. Afterwards we can see that the rates of
unemployment, while at least double for the last 20 years, have affected the younger
population more than the prime working cohort of 25-49, which seemed to be fairly stable in
there trends of decline during the 1990’s.
Of course, the 1990’s represented two significant factors as they relate to the labor
force and the social assistance being rolled out by the state. Primarily the boom of the service
industry happened in the early to middle of the decade which changed the landscape of both
the employed as well as the demographic of the unemployed. In the simplest terms, the boom
of service and technology markets pushed demand for educated workers and created a
hierarchy of unemployment by education, and to some extent class, which extends to today
as seen by the table below conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Table 2: Unemployment level by amount of education
Education Level

Unemployment rate per
qualification

Secondary degree
Degree or equivalent
Some higher education
GCE A-level
GCE B-C level
Other Qualifications
No Qualifications

Source: (Bell and Blanchflower 2010)
Unsurprisingly, scholars have “special concerns regarding employment prospects of
these young people without qualifications - the disadvantaged young - going forward” (Bell
and Blanchflower 2010, 9). Additionally, it is clear that youth unemployment rates are
particularly high for racial minorities across qualifications “where black unemployment rates
ages 18-24 were 26.3 percent and for Asians were 21.3%” and that relationship being
exaggerated “for those without qualifications in the 2008 labor force survey at 47.4 for
blacks, 30 percent for young whites and 38.3 percent for Asians respectively” (Ibid, 9).
These growths of unemployment as seen above, in the latter half of table 1, have
matched an increasing population according to the latest census information. In particular
however, the current proportion of the youngest cohort within the labor force has been
increasing faster relative to the older 50 plus members of the labor force. This matches the
information that “the population increase of the UK in the period mid-2001 to mid-2010 was
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caused by there being 1.4 million more births than deaths” (Office for National Statistics
2013).

Figure 1: Mid-year population estimates for the United Kingdom

Source: Office for National Statistics, National Records of Scotland, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency
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Figure 2: Welfare spending as percent of GDP by specific programs

Additionally, the “total social spending as a share of national income grew
continuously after 1999 and the initial period of public sector austerity following the
incoming Labor Party pledge to stick its predecessor’s spending plans”(Hills 2011, 592). In
fact social spending looks to be fairly constant with spending levels being almost identical
between 1995/6 and 2007/8 despite the radically different economic conditions surrounding
each time period and only since the 2008 recession under Conservative David Cameron’s
Administration has the social spending spiked above 30 percent of the GDP. However,
despite the mutual rise in population and the rise in spending as a portion of the GDP
climbing higher than it has been in the last several decades, the amount of social spending
per capita has grown much slower according to the graph below, taken from the Office for
National Statistics, Social Trends number 41. It is additionally evident that spending trends
on specific line items have been more or less constant among the different conservative and
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labor administrations. The only outlier amongst spending trends being found in table 3,
below, showing that even as unemployment rates have gone up fairly dramatically since the
mid 2000’s, the amount of social expenditure on unemployment benefits has gone down
almost one-third since 2006.

Table 3: UK Social Expenditures in Millions
Expenditures

2006/07

2008/09

2009/10

Total
Sickness and disability
Old Age
Family and Children
Unemployment

26,044
7,305
8,892
6,654
1,424

29,187
8,469
9,929
7,481
1,384

30,385
8,952
10,290
8,082
1,105

Source: ONS, social trends 41

In other words, it is apparent that welfare spending by the UK government has grown,
in spite of the spoken intent by Prime Ministers from Margret Thatcher to Tony Blair, and as
recently as David Cameron who summarized his 2011 “Big Society” spending platform as
“ending the old big government, top down way of running public services” (Hills 2011, 605).
Such a government platform, consistently forwarded by the UK government, seems to fly in
the face of the undeniable growth of welfare activity during the modern era of the UK
welfare state. Growth has occurred, from approximately 240 billion in 1980 to around 620
billion in 2008, correlating with the growth in social need and a growing population.
However, Hills shows that things are not entirely as they seem. Specifically, Hills points to
several means testing and privatization initiatives beginning in the Thatcher administration
which have been slowly working to change the architecture of welfare spending in order to
allow for “the increasingly important pure private sector, with no public involvement at all”
(Ibid, 605) within the financing and distribution of health, education and other social
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services. The result being that the proportion welfare activity, including 620 billion pounds,
was approximately divided with only 45 percent (or 298 billion) coming from government
spending (Hills 2011, 594). One example of these shifts occurred in the public and
subsidized housing sector of social assistance where “the reduction of the state’s role,
through the outright privatization of council housing under the Right to Buy4, transfers to
private, although not for-profit, housing associations” has led to a more unchecked
distributional responsibility to the market based private sector. Further, Hills offers one
possible conclusion: “growth in welfare activity has not meant an increase in services for all”
(Hills 2011, 605) and that growth in welfare spending has not necessarily met growing social
need and expectations of citizens. However, this would only be true if there exists conflicting
spending priorities between the public and the state that is supposed to offer the risk
protection of its citizens.

Unemployment Programs
Before progressing farther, it should be noted that social spending and social
assistance programs for the unemployed in the United Kingdom are divided among three
major programs which target and provide assistance for specific aspects of unemployed life.
The first of those programs being the Universal Credit (UC) followed by the Jobseekers
Allowance (JSA) and the Housing Benefit.
The Universal Credit is a relatively new invention which has resulted in the merging
of several programs like the Employment and Support Allowance among others offered by

4

Right to Buy is an ongoing program which acts to give grants to tenants of public council owned housing in order
to promote the economically preferred activity of home ownership
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the Department of Works and Pensions. The Universal Credit is essentially a universal
benefit with several different intended target recipients, providing benefits based on different
programmatic initiatives such as a “minimum income guarantee” or “incapacity benefits.”5
This benefit offers direct financial support, into individuals bank accounts, to those who need
financial assistance with basic costs of living whether employed, self-employed or
unemployed. This major program has two main factors in regards to eligibility and benefit
received. The critical detail of this program is that both eligibility and benefits are based on
your total income which is calculated through national insurance contributions (essentially
income taxes). This means that this program is a means tested one that rewards those
previously successful participants in the market more than others. Additionally, the baseline
for benefits is divided by age and length of time on the support program. First, there is a
divide between those citizens who are 25 and older, who are able to collect at minimum 71
pounds sterling a week as compared to the 56 pounds made available to those aged 16-24.
These baselines are set up for the initial 13 weeks in which someone applies for the UC.
Similar benefit rules and baselines for income support are illustrated below.

5

Policy language from policy descriptions. www.gov.uk/universal -credit
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Table 4: Universal Credit Guidelines according to Department of Works &
Pensions

After the initial 13 weeks however, there is a catch, where any person who qualifies
on a weekly income basis for the first 13 weeks of UC simply must meet that means tested
baseline of less than 16,000 pounds savings and less than 99.50 pounds per week of earned
income. Yet, after the initial period of collection it becomes required to participate in a
“work-related activity group” where individuals must meet with a “Jobcentre” advisor on a
weekly basis to discuss their reasons for being on this benefit and determine potential
plans/goals for future employment, community service or other positive skills training
determined by the advisor in order to continue collecting the Universal Credit, so long as
they are not receiving any benefit for major medical disability reasons.
The second major program primarily dealing with the unemployed population is what
is called the Jobseekers Allowance. Like the UC above, the JSA is a directly deposited lump
sum of cash paid in two week increments based on the intentional and active pursuit of
employment as well as specific means tested categories, as seen in the table below. Again,
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we see disparities based on age but here we see further disparities based on socially positive
activities like having children and being in a relationship. A further similarity to the UC,
above, is that the Jobseekers Allowance has no established time limits, only the need to
check in to the Jobcentre every two weeks, commonly referred to as “signing on,” with
documentation proving that you are actively pursuing work. Additionally, there are some
basic limits in place, just as there are with the ESA, you must have less than 16,000 pounds
in savings and must work less than 16 hours a week, bringing home less than 6,000 pounds
annually. Lastly, you must have been living in the UK for at least 3 months and must prove
yourself to be a European Union citizen, if not a UK national.

Table 5: Unemployment Benefits by Category (JSA)

Finally, it is important to note that the UK “Housing Benefit” plays an important
role for the unemployed, despite being a broader Universal Credit like the ESA, which
merely targets those who fall below a baseline of weekly income/total savings as opposed to
the JSA which is specifically geared at those who are pursuing active employment. Again,
this program is for those who are on “low employment” or unemployed with a total income
or household savings of less than 6,000 pounds according to the UK government listing for
program eligibility. The primary difference with this program is that the level of assistance is
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primarily based on size of the residence rather than number of people or the amount of rent
owed. It should also be noted that the Housing Benefit is only for rental properties and does
not factor into owned housing. See table 6 below to examine the benefits available.
Table 6: Housing Benefit by property size

Beyond these official and yearly accounted for public expenditures, it is important
that occasionally there are some short term policy initiatives forwarded by different
administrations trying to address major problem in the short term. In this case both programs
were launched by the Cameron Administration6 in April of 2012.
The Youth Contract is essentially a program which will guarantee job placements “to
18-24 year-olds who have been out of work for a year, with benefits being withdrawn for
those who refuse to take up the offer”(Andrew Grice 2013). This is an interesting two
pronged approach, both sympathetic to those young people who are believed to truly not
have access to legitimate job opportunities in the recent economic recession, but also echoes
the underlying impatience and harder line most politicians want to take on public spending
and cutting those off from welfare who may be choosing to not help themselves. The Youth
6

Although the real flag bearer for the youth contract was Nick Clegg, leader of the Liberal Democrats.
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Contract performs to accomplish this promise of guaranteed work placements by offering six
months of fully subsidized job starts where “until April 2015, employers are able to take
advantage of 160,000 such wage incentives” (Department for Work and Pensions n.d.).
These wage subsidies for hiring are worth up to £2,275 each when they employ an eligible 18
to 24 year old for 6 months through the Jobcentre in public and private apprenticeship
positions. One final aspect of the Youth Contract is that it was geared specifically at targeting
young school leavers on benefits but not looking for jobs, otherwise classified as the
disengaged unemployed youth, and trying to incentivize them into joining the labor force.
The second program known officially as the “Work Programme,” but more
commonly as the “Welfare-to-Work” scheme, launched in September of 2011, is a response
pervasive long term unemployment and the need to get citizens “the help they needed to find
a job and, crucially, given support to stay in work” (BBC Editor 2013). There are two
important hallmarks of this program which differentiate it from the Youth Contract. The first
important aspect being, it targets individuals of all ages, although it places a particular
emphasis on youth unemployment between the ages 16-24. The second important thing to
note is that while there is a significant focus on targeting unemployment lasting for more
than 12 or 24 months, based on the age of the unemployed person, there are also significantly
more short term job seeking tools which have been made available until the program is set to
finish in 2016.
The first issue is that of age requirements, where the program is intended to
immediately place individuals between the ages of 16-24 in some type of work related
experience after 1 year of unemployment, whereas anyone 25 and over gets placed after 2
years of unemployment. However, unlike the Youth Contract, work placement is voluntary,
Page | 75

either in the public sector or in some other form of community service, which provides work
experience and or skills training in order to continue collecting unemployment benefits. Part
of the idea behind this program is for people to not be allowed to be stagnant on
unemployment benefits and increase the incentive to get out of unemployment in order to get
paid a real wage for the work they are required to do under the Work Programme.
Additionally, since work placement through the program once begun are supposed to last up
to 2 years, there is the assumption that hard work and competency will help land a permanent
job with that institution or at least a job referral and an improved resume. The second point to
note, while only a five year plan at this time, there is also initiatives through the Work
Programme which incentivize businesses to allow 30 day training and informational
internships through the Jobcentre allowing for a potentially easier job search during the
recession.

Social Need
As stated above, policy can be, and to a large extent is, synonymous with a
government strategy to affect a specific outcome. However, strategic and intentional change
is rarely required or pursued without the presence of a problem. In this case, the foremost
problem that is facing a majority of welfare states and indeed large portions of the world is
youth unemployment, characterized by those 16-25 year olds that are flooding labor markets
without the ability to join the labor force in the aftermath of the global economic recession in
2008. In fact, according to the recent figures put out by the Cameron administration during
the Conservative National Convention, “The Institute for Fiscal Studies says 410,000 under25s were currently on JSA, costing £1.2 billion a year. A further 380,000 are on housing
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benefit, costing £1.8 billion” (Wintour and editor 2013). Such a problem was not
unforeseeable and has proven to be a reoccurring theme. Just a little over a decade ago,
during a major period of economic prosperity, “when Tony Blair came to power in 1997,
there were 664,000 16- to 24-year-olds who weren't in training, or didn't have a job… when
Gordon Brown left it in May 2010, there were 920,000… a rise from 14.5% of the youth
population to nearly a fifth”(Patterson 2014).
Thus it is clear that the issue of youth unemployment is very real based on a
combination of several factors including but certainly not limited to the economic shrinking
that took place on the global economy and domestic labor forces worldwide as a part of the
recession. According to the study by David Blanchflower into the reoccurring theme and
problem of youth unemployment in western society, many societies have labor forces
growing faster than the economy with more 20 year olds than 25 year olds. Further, the
problem becomes clear when you consider that people are living longer and retiring later so
there are less and less transitional gaps for newcomers to the labor market to fill each year.
Blanchflower shows that with these ongoing and predictable pressures on the labor market,
any downturn or economic shrinking would prove to be detrimental to the employment and
aid infrastructure of these westernized welfare economies. Looking to the quarterly
projections on unemployment published in the Labor Force Survey by the UK Office of
National Statistics, the 16-24 year old cohort actively pursuing work but finding themselves
unemployed by the count of the UK government hit a record high, where “in November
youth unemployment in Britain passed 1 million for the first time in 15 years, equivalent to
22% of those aged 16 to 24” (Elliott and Treanor 2012). That compares with the 6.2 or 4.6
percent unemployment in the 25-49 and over 50 year old categories respectively. Those
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numbers further illustrate the conclusion of the discussion paper on unemployment trends put
out by the Institute for the Study of Labor, showing that “the young are disproportionally hit
hard” (Bell and Blanchflower 2010, 5).
However, while these totaling of unemployment by age groups certainly helps
demonstrate that individuals in the youngest sections have a disproportionally higher
probability of losing their jobs as a result of the most recent economic crisis, there are further
troubling numbers which outline the danger posed on the 16-24 year old cohort during a
recession. Specifically, a 2008 OECD study focusing on the youngest workers in the labor
force, specifically 20-24 for the purposes of that study, showed that there were high levels of
inequalities regarding their average relative earnings as compared to their adult counterparts.
The fruits of this study showed that the UK had the second worst inequality index between
the average pay scales of the youngest cohort making only 60 percent of the average adult
wage defined by the age category of 40-49. This index falls below the OECD average of 64
percent of adult incomes and has further shown increasing inequality since 1996 which
measured the UK youth making approximately 68 percent of the adult wages. That means not
only are the youth of the United Kingdom the most likely to become jobless during a
recession but they are not surprisingly the least financially equipped group to handle such a
period of joblessness without clear assistance. In this category, in fact, the UK only fairs
better than the United States with a calculated youth average earning amounting to only 57
percent of their adult counterparts which is often accredited to the lack of labor unions and
worker protections in the United States. Although the UK certainly has retained much
stronger union base, Bell and Blanchflower have noted that youth participation in UK unions
is extremely low so as to make themselves more attractive to employers.
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Part 2: Operationalizing Andersen’s Model
National Values
In order to determine the validity of that assumption as it has been applied to the
identification of the United Kingdom as a liberal welfare state, it will be important to look at
the variety of social attitude surveys conducted both by state and non-state institutions which
will help to establish trends and underlying values which may be at play in the ultimate
outcome of determining how social resources are distributed. Since the major issue of youth
unemployment is the pervasive threat of this major emerging group of individuals needing
assistance that will not be provided by the free market system, it makes sense to look at as
much survey data as possible regarding the social opinions as they pertain to providing
assistance to that group of people and the conditions of such programs.
Particularly when looking to understand national values through survey data in the
United Kingdom, the first and most important source is the British Social Attitudes Survey
which has been conducted by the National Centre of Social Research since 1983. This
commitment to creating the most extensive historical longitudinal study of British attitudes
available has meant that this survey has been one of the most important survey databases to
academic researchers studying the UK.
The first litmus test questions are primarily concerned with how people feel about
spending in general. The first question of the survey on government spending and welfare
has been the same since the first survey in 1983 and is a standard question asking participants
to choose one of three statements about their preferred course of action for the government in
terms of future spending. These statements read as follows: “Reduce taxes and spend less on
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health, education and social benefits.” “Keep taxes and spending on these services the same
level as now.” “Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social spending”
(BSA, 35). The results of this question are as seen below.

Figure 1: BSA Attitudes towards Tax and Spending, 1938-2012

Source:

British Social Attitudes Survey, National Centre for Social Research, v.30,
2013

From the figure above, two things are clear: first, that the opinion to reduce spending
has been fairly stagnant over the past thirty years. Second, the portion of individuals who
want the government to increase taxes and spending has nearly been cut in half after shifting
upwards of the 60 percent during a majority of the 1990’s and reaching a high of around
65percnt in 2002. Since it is primarily the past 25 years that this study is focusing on, which
encompasses the several rather drastic periods of recession and growth, it is important in
particular that the desire for increasing welfare spending happened primarily during the boom
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of the late 80s and beginning of the 90’s. Additionally, the spending preferences appear to
have been fairly stable during the market downturns towards the latter half of the 1990’s and
the free fall of this group of people did not occur until the next boom in the early 2000’s and
continued through the deep economic recession which is still affecting the country today.
The same trend is apparent when asked a similar litmus test question, looking for
people’s attitudes towards the government’s spending strategies when specifically geared
towards the unemployed. The survey asked people to agree with one of the following two
statements: “Benefits for unemployed people are too low and cause hardship” or “Benefits
for unemployed people are too high and discourage them from finding jobs.” The results of
this more specific question looking for basic opinions on welfare spending are shown below
in figure 2.

Figure 2: Attitudes towards level of unemployment benefits, 1983-2012

Source:

British Social Attitudes Survey, National Centre for Social Research, v.30,
2013
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Here again we see some interesting trends that appear split by decades more than
by political administration and state of the economy. The major thing to note would be that
since welfare nominally went up, as is shown above in Figure 2, in the mid 1990’s and again
in the early 2000’s, those jumps were mirrored by the largest jumps in the increasing percent
of the population who believe social spending is too high. Another such question that has
been asked since 1985, a simple yes or no question, dealing with the fundamental basis of
unemployment spending in a welfare state was this: “Do you believe it is the government’s
responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed?” (BSA, 33) The
results of which show that there has been a steady decrease from an agreement rate of 83% in
1989 down to 59% in 2012 with a low of 50% in 2006.
Now that we have examined some data trends on how British citizens view both
general social spending, as well as spending specifically earmarked for unemployment
programs, it would make sense to look more closely at how those same citizens view those
that receive those unemployment benefits both generally and when broken down into age
groups. First, in the table below, there are several questions asking whether or not the
participants agree with a statement regarding the conditions by which people receive benefits
as well as the characteristics of those same individuals who are receiving social assistance.
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Table 7: Attitudes on welfare spending

The results in the table above offers a good representation of the fairly stable
positions of citizens in the United Kingdom who seem to have fairly specific perceptions of
unemployment and the unemployed community with most questions eliciting little more than
10 percent variations across the 20 or so years of measurement. However, there are a few
questions that I would like to highlight as a comparison between the answers of the first two
questions in juxtaposition to the answers of the last question. In particular, the first two
questions in the table referring to withdrawing benefits from individuals as a matter of
practical dependence and of perception of deserving benefits, shows that the British public
seem not overtly against dropping benefits for this group of people. The First question, for
instance, shows that roughly half the population at any given point thinks that the withdrawal
of benefits would be too damaging for this somewhat marginalized community. Further, only
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an average of about 35 percent of the population believes that people who receive
unemployment assistance don’t deserve any help from the federal government. These figures
at first seem to be in contradiction of the increasingly negative perception of welfare
spending in figure 2. Yet the last question of the survey displays the high level of citizens
skepticism, around 80 percent any given year, seem to believe that a large percent of people
who collect unemployment benefits do so fraudulently in that they do not actively pursue
options to get off welfare.
Trying to capture the perceptions of unemployment spending and social assistance
becomes murkier when looking at redistribution preferences of different groups of people
divided by age, class and party affiliation as they regard income support to unemployment
programs. Looking at the table below, we see that between 1987 and 2007, there is a general
trend across every single age group, class and political party in favor, of less income
redistribution to the poorest segments of the population including those collecting benefits as
unemployed individuals. However, while this general trend is upheld by most of those social
clusters when we extend the data to 2012, with many groups retaining a notably waning view
of social assistance to the youngest age group and those affiliated with the Labour party.
However, it is important to note the significant increase in support along every single social
cluster during the financial recession that occurred between 2007 and 2012. This is important
to note as it gives a case where perceptions of social assistance may not necessarily be as
stable as the tables and figures above might suggest. In addition, the survey data below
shows that perceptions of unemployment assistance may indeed be impacted by the
economic trends of recession or growth.
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Table 8: Income Redistributions for Unemployed

Support within the Legislature
Looking back to the methods section above, we see that Andersen outlines the
importance of the legislative process as it is the refractive element within his model
transforming what he isolates as the national values into what becomes general welfare
legislation. In this case, media accounts of party positions and public discourse, in order to
determine what issues and more importantly what spending values have been given priorities
by the legislative actors.
Currently the important parties to examine include the dominant conservative –
liberal democrat coalition party headed by PM David Cameron and Nick Clegg and the
oppositional Labor Party headed by Ed Milliband. The framework for analyzing these media
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sources is to look for specific attributes, themes or buzzwords discussed previously in the
methodology section. It is through this open examination of the conservative coalition
followed by the labor party’s take on the key issue of youth unemployment, in which we will
make decisions about what is really happening in the UK legislative process.
David Cameron recently gave a speech on his visions for his “Big Society7” initiative
at the conservative conference in October of 2013; The Guardian picked up on a few key
sound bites. The loudest and clearest being the idea that Tories are “dedicated to sending
tough messages on welfare” and in particular that “all jobseekers allowance and housing
benefit would be removed from anyone unreasonably turning down the offer of work or
education” (Wintour and editor 2013). This follows the scheme recently set out by the
Conservative party known simply as the “Youth Contract” which offers to subsidize the work
placements of unemployed youth for three years at unemployment benefit equivalents as the
chief youth unemployment initiative. The stated intention of Cameron is to eliminate people
from living on benefits as he discusses the 2014 conservative manifesto: “Today it is still
possible to leave school, sign on, find a flat, start claiming housing benefit and opt for a life
on benefits. It's time for bold action here. We should ask, as we write our next manifesto, if
that option should really exist at all. Instead we should give young people a clear, positive
choice. Go to school. Go to college. Do an apprenticeship. Get a job” (Wintour 2013). These
programs discussed by PM Cameron, such as a scheme looking to take away “housing
benefits8 for all under 25 year olds in or out of work” showcase what Cameron acknowledges
as measures “designed to cut public spending not linked to training…. [because] there are

7

Formally dubbed policy response by Conservative party in February 2011 as an umbrella for initiative leading to
economic and social reform goals of the Cameron administration
8
Exemptions would be made for single parents and disabled individuals
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some people who need not so much a nudge as a dunt towards the workplace” (Wintour
2013).
Additionally found within the coalition media storm has been the particularly covered
question on whether or not older workers should be pensioned off earlier so as to increase the
amount of openings for the young jobless. On this question the conservative coalition line
has been to “defend the role of more experienced staff” (Peev 2013). Further, Liberal
Democrats Pensions Minister Steve Webb went on to discuss that returning to the 1977
“work release scheme” age category of 60-plus as an initiative “encouraging early retirement
in order to give to youngsters jobs would be counter-productive…. All it did was stick lots of
men in their early 60’s on benefits; it did nothing for youth unemployment” (Ibid). Instead,
George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and chief economics minister to the
coalition government has set out a proposal for what to do with those currently out of work
and long term-jobless individuals alike. As was mentioned before, creating vacancies through
forcing older workers into pensions is off the table, but instead Osborne suggests “jobless
Britons could be forced to do community work to keep their unemployment
payments”(Castle 2013). This quote, as a part of his speech at the Tory’s annual Manchester
Conference, re-instilled his desire to “crack down on welfare dependency” through a variety
of “tough love” programs (Ibid). Osborne views this new policy initiative as yet another
aspect of the growing conservative platform on youth unemployment which he describes to
include programs where “the jobless can be sent on work placements, where they are
required to do a month’s full-time work to keep their benefits, and the government has
introduced a cash limit on the amount per week that most people ages 16 to 64 can receive
from the state”(Castle 2013). In general terms, Minister Osborne summed up the party
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stance on youth unemployment with this statement: “No one will be ignored or left without
help, but no one will get something for nothing…. A fair welfare system is fair to those who
need it and fair for those that pay for it, too” (Ibid). The stated end goal being to produce a
system for hardworking people where “welfare is a safety net for the needy, not a bed for the
lazy” (Ibid).
As for the Labour Party leadership, the tagline coming from frontbencher Rachel
Reeves has declared recently that “Labour will be tougher than the Tories when it comes to
slashing the benefits bill” further guaranteeing that “unemployed will not be allowed to
linger on benefits” (Helm and editor 2013). The policy initiative behind this new tough
stance on unemployment, as well as isolating the issue of youth unemployment, is called the
“jobs guarantee scheme” which outlines a benefits framework for the distribution of welfare.
Under this new policy scheme for instance, there is specific time limit on how long
individuals may collect specific jobseekers’ allowances and other unemployment benefits.
For the under 25 cohort, a job will be offered after one year of unemployment and for the rest
of the labor force above the age of 25, a public service job is guaranteed after two years of
unemployment. However, if under the Labour parties proposed “compulsory jobs guarantee,
if you refuse that job you forgo your benefits” (Helm and editor 2013).
A further set of proposed policies by the current shadow cabinet include programs
like the “contributory principle” where benefits are awarded based on tax contributions and
an official yearly benefit cap so as to limit the amount anyone can live on benefits so as to
encourage less dependency and time spent on benefits.
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Benefits Provided
In order to make sense of the relationships of the previously operationalized variables
it is necessary to look finally at what is actually happening within these major welfare
programs discussed within the contextual narrative segment of this chapter. Therefore I have
decided to present the initial facts and expenditure figures from each program in a table
below.

Table 9: Department for Work & Pensions expenditures in Million(s)
pounds 2001-2013
Year

Total
DWP
programs

Income
Support
Total
Expenditure

Min
Income
Guarantee

ESA

JSA

2001

81,154

13,220

3,923

----

2,882

11,242

2003

97,579

14,154

4,327

-----

2,606

12,672

2005

110,232

11,607

2,382

-----

2,204

13,162

2007

118,131

8,839

----*

-----

2,440

14,841

2009

133,315

8,685

*

127

2,857

17,103

2010

146,280

8,374

*

1,267

4,684

19,989

2011

151,457

7,856

*

2,232

4,474

21,427

2012

157,687

6,997

*

3,554

4,929

22,820

2013

165,383

5,309

*

6,780

5,170

23,900

HousingBenefit

*the min income guarantee became separate program in the ESA
Moving from the leftmost column to the right, several trends are immediately apparent,
including the fact that the total expenditure on welfare programs through the Department of
Works and Pensions has steadily risen over the past decade; however the first order of
business needs to be an explanation for what is happening in the middle three columns and
the listed expenditures of Income Support and the sub program of the Minimum Income
Guarantee. For starters, it is important to note that I have included the program known as
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Income Support as the forbearer of both the ESA and the UC programs which now cover the
cost of a minimum income guarantee. As such, the Income Support expenditures became
officially divided from that cost in 2007 but still offered a good indication of its focus on
incapacity and caretaker benefits throughout the 2000’s. Further, it was only during this
program in which the DWP accounted for the minimum income guarantee as a specific
programmatic sub heading before moving on to a universal and regularized expenditure
under the ESA and Universal Credit programs which are intended to affect different targets
(like Income Support) but nevertheless lump them all under one program account. It is
important to note that both the Income Support program and the Employment and Support
Allowance have now been merging as part of the new Universal Credit initiative from the
Department of Works and Pensions to consolidate and simplify its benefits programs. That
being said, it is hard to pull any really meaningful data out of those middle two columns
which are so intertwined. However, it would appear that in the measurements of funding
allocated to non-disabled people filing for the minimum income guarantee from 2003 to 2005
was cut in half despite rises in total expenditures by the DWP.
More significantly for the purposes of this study, however, would be the fairly stable and
slightly downward trend of the Jobseekers Allowance up until it skyrocketed between 2009
and 2010 during the major layoffs and rise of unemployment during the recession which has
stabilized, but continued to trend upwards through 2013. This would suggest that it is indeed
harder to find a job in the current economy and is potentially linked to the national values
table above in table 5.1, which showed a mirror decline in people who would agree that
people collecting JSA could find a job if they really wanted one. Those findings combine to
reinforce the social need discussion earlier in this section.
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Something that may be a bit surprising, however, is the matching trends between the total
expenditures of the DWP in coordination with the rising spending on the Housing Benefit
which is another one of those means tested by income credit programs. In fact, the program
has more than doubled over the last 12 years making the Housing Benefit one of the largest
single assistance programs targeting marginalized individuals. For this reason, it is clear why
the Housing Benefit policy is considered to be one of the largest benefit programs for
unemployed and disengaged jobless individuals despite currently not accounting for
occupation or lack thereof within the provision of this program. The fate and use of this
Housing Benefit is thus a major source of discussion in the political conversation within the
media as seen above in the “Political Support within the Legislature” section.

Part 3: Operationalizing Mettler’s Model
Organized Narrow Interests
Organized interests take form in unions or business lobbies and in the case of the
United Kingdom there are two predominant “business advocacy groups.” They are the
Confederation for Business Industry and the Employment Related Services Organization.
According to their respective websites, these groups offer the unequaled ability to network
and foster an environment for all its member businesses to let their voices be heard and
utilize collective resources to conduct research and offer key policy recommendations to help
tackle societies biggest issues within the private sector, including unemployment. This is not
a surprising claim for business interest groups to make according to Kevin Farnsworth. In
fact, according to Farnsworth, such groups are the most prepared actors to invest in a desired
policy outcome for a variety of reasons including the governments’ reliance on increasing
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economic activity as well as the elite access and relationships between business leaders and
top politician; “hence, states must try to induce corporations to invest through pursuing
policies which are favorable to the pursuit of profits” (Farnsworth 2006, 475). In this way,
business and political interests can be more naturally aligned than the relationship between
the state and labor unions, particularly when the pressure such unions can exert on the state
diminishes. This was the case for the UK as “union power was drastically reduced by a series
of measures designed to reduce the ability of trade unions to take effective strike action,
coupled by increasing levels of unemployment, which dramatically reduced trade union
membership” (Ibid, 483).
Thus, for elite or structuralist theories of power organization in government argue,
like Farnsworth who is one of the leading authors in the UK business elite literature, “it is
impossible to understand and explain the shape and delivery of social policy unless we
explain the role of business” (Ibid, 473). This echoes the confidant assertion made at the top
of the CBI homepage; “CBI members enjoy real input into key government decisions, access
to politicians and business leaders - and intelligence to help prepare for economic and
political change” (CBI.org.uk). However, how business interests firms are able to have such
impact and why they apparently have such unequalled access to the policy process must be
more satisfactorily examined.
For Farnsworth, the why question is actually antecedent to the how question, and as
such, helps explain what mechanisms are most available to push policy decision in a business
friendly direction. In this vein, he cites three particular reasons why business interests are
constantly harder to ignore in policy decisions. First, he argues that historically, since the
Thatcher administration, “changes in social policy introduced since the 1970’s have been in
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response either to business demands or more general concerns about national
competitiveness and he needs of business” (Farnsworth 2006, 473). This is made clear in an
example from one of Farnsworth’s previous publications on the specific policy interests and
lobbying history of the Confederation of British Industry. In particular, he shows that the
primary policy interest of the CBI has been for a long time, matters of education reform and
competitive jobs training schemes backed by the Department of Education. Of course, the
methods used to determine that these interests were indeed the focus of the CBI are measured
from their use of specific lobby mechanisms, which are discussed below. However, at this
stage it is important to note that these were the focus of the CBI policy team during the 80’s
and 90’s9 which contained a series of policy positions mirrored in the 1988 Education
Reform Act, which in turn laid the framework for “the establishment of Training and
Enterprise Councils and National Vocational Qualifications10, these being areas of particular
importance for employers” (Farnsworth 1998, 24).
Indeed education and training policies are one of the major business concerns for
competitiveness, and as such, are understandably the primary focus of organized business
particularly in a globalizing economy with ever increasing competition. This leads to the
second and third structural reasons why Farnsworth argues the presence of business interest
has continually increased within the modern political landscape. Those reason being: UK
business has an increasing stake in policy outcomes in a globalizing economy and thus will
be willing to commit ever greater time and resources to achieve desired ends, and since

9

Business interests in competent training skills to make youth more employable continues to be a primary policy
issue for the CBI
10
These programs address the need for more formalized, federally funded and regulated professional skills training
and apprenticeship opportunities
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government funding heavily relies on healthy businesses they have mutual interests in
providing greater access to the policy process for major business lobby organizations.
These basic explanations as to why the business lobby interests have been given
greater access than unions and the general public also help indicate what mechanisms these
lobbies use to exert pressure and influence upon government institutions like the Department
of Education, and policy decisions including the Education Reform Act example discussed
above. The mechanisms which are primarily used by the CBI and lobbies in general within
the UK context are twofold. First, they work to achieve their interests “through producing
clear and concise policy statements” (Farnsworth 2006, 483) so as to serve as an unofficial
policy advisory agency taking on the cost for policy research and analysis in order to supply
strategic briefings to policy makers and the media. The second primary tool, utilizing the
elite network groups of being well funded, and connected political activists in order to
generate “less formalized contact… initiated and organized and by the CBI itself”
(Farnsworth 1998, 31) such as the high profile annual conferences and long list of calendar
events which bring together business and political elites in an environment which no other
social groups or interests have access.
Generally, the former is considered the primary way that the CBI forwards its
business interests, and indeed, Farnsworth demonstrates this point by highlighting the
number and subjects of policy briefs presented by the CBI which he then contrasts with
major policy changes that happen in the same general time period. Observing the table
below, in fact, we can see an interesting pattern that in the same year that major education
and training reform was being discussed in parliament (1988) the CBI published eight policy
briefs. Additionally, this trend continued to match as was discussed above the major
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institutional reforms such as the Training and Enterprise Councils and National Vocational
Qualifications through the year 1995. The frequency of social policy papers produced by the
CBI in addition to the timing in which specific topics are produced has led to two
conclusions: first, that “the CBI is a more responsive rather than initiating organization when
it comes to social policy” and second, that “its views in this area is none the less of great
importance” (Farnsworth 1998, 24). Further, these types of policy briefings are clearly still a
major way that the CBI exerts particular policy preferences as the government works to
tackle major issues. One such recent 2011 policy recommendation by the CBI called “Action
for Jobs: How to Get the UK Working” offers a particular business take on the youth
unemployment issue facing the UK. Within the introduction and framing of the complex
policy demands of youth unemployment, the CBI reminds all that it is a business problem
and, as such, needs to be a part of the discussion, “as businesses, we should not be
complaining from the sidelines – it is our duty to get involved and help the process” (CBI
2011, 9). As for the impact of this particular policy briefing from 2011, all that can be said is
that it called for many new “employability” work placement programs offered through the
Department of Education which have been mirrored in aspects of the 2013 “Youth Contract”
and “Work Programme” described above.
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Table 10: CBI Policy Briefings from1980 – 1995

Source:(Farnsworth 1998, 25)
As for the second major influence mechanism described basically as elite access
above; it is clear that the CBI and business interests are taking advantage of close
relationships with political leaders. A political truth made clear by a number of recent
scandals involving the secret correspondence and negotiations between CBI members and
high level political actors. For instance “according to official documents leaked to the BBC
and Corporate Watch in 2001, UK government officials briefed the leaders of some of the
UK’s largest companies on their negotiating positions at the 2001 General Agreement on
Trade in Services meetings, despite the fact that these negotiations were supposed to be
conducted in private” (Farnsworth 2006, 484). Additionally, there was a major scandal as
recently as 2004 where public advocates ordered the Blair administration to publicize “secret
meetings between it and representatives of major corporations” (Ibid, 484). All this
information and evidence compiled has led to a fairly convincing British lobby literature
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which makes the conclusion that “business has never before been so embedded in social
policy” as it is today (Farnsworth 2006, 492).

Invisible Policy Process
As was discussed in the theory and methods chapter above, one of the crucial
variables for Suzanne Mettler’s model of state social policy behavior is what she finds to be
the presence of, or lack of, an invisible policy process, which obstructs the reality of policy
decisions being made which will in turn pacify the general public and so allow the previously
discussed organized business interests to dominate within policy decision making at the
highest level without competition. For the most part, this is measured by individual’s
experiences and perceptions of their experiences with welfare programs and what programs
are providing to whom.
One of the most basic questions that begin to get at this sense of invisibility is the
question: “Are you, or anyone in your family, directly affected by unemployment benefits at
the present time?” (Gallup, 1996). This was a question that was part of a larger Gallup survey
on perceptions of the welfare system in the UK. Another question on that survey which
should offer a nice contrast to the first is this: “Do you have any friends or acquaintances at
the moment who are affected by unemployment benefits?” (Ibid). The results are shown in a
basic table below.
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Answer

Result

Q1.Yes, myself or other

30%

Q1.No

71%

Q2. Yes

63%

Q2. No

37%

These, of course, are just general questions trying to see if people have a certain
attitude towards what programs are considered to be unemployment programs as well as if
people perceive themselves to be collecting “welfare.” Unfortunately, this is a really
insufficient series of questions since we don’t have perfect information as to whether or not
these individuals are collecting any kind of state benefits. That being said, it is interesting
that there is a practically inverse relationship between the two questions that might suggest
that people are less inclined to agree that they are collecting welfare assistance while they are
more inclined to see others as those individuals taking handouts from the state. Another
problem is that it is impossible to tell how many are actually unemployed other than making
an educated guess by looking at the year average from 1996 (see graph below). One possible
conclusion based on the answers above, as well as factoring the information on who collects
outright “unemployment” benefit in the graph below, when considering the multitude of
programs that do provide assistance to the unemployed described in part 1 of this chapter, is
that people may have different ideas of exactly what are unemployment benefits.
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Figure 3: Unemployment Population and JSA Graph

Source:(“Economy Tracker: Unemployment” 2014)
These questions try to determine how much information is actually in society
regarding programs and which groups are collecting benefits. Some of these questions were
best asked in part 2 of this chapter and so I have decided to include them again here since
they are equally important to this section.
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The most important questions to look at this time around would be the last three
questions which try to capture people’s perceptions regarding the legitimacy as well as the
profiles of people collecting unemployment benefits. First, we see in the question asking
“most people could find a job if they really wanted one,” (BSA 2013) that something
happened between 1996 and 1998 to make people believe on a more permanent basis that
people collecting benefits could find a job if they really wanted one. However, in the graph
of unemployment above, there is seemingly no dramatic change or event other than a fairly
steady decline in both unemployment as well as Jobseekers Allowance claimants. In contrast,
an almost identical question asked, regarding whether people collecting benefits were in fact
“fiddling about” rather than presumably actively pursuing work or a similar way off the JSA,
saw none of the same trends as the question asking whether or not people could find work if
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they really wanted to. This comparison might suggest to some authors that one of those
questions was badly stated and skewed the results one way or another; other authors like
Mettler may conclude that there is a lack of clear information by which people are able to
make opinions.
The final question in the survey suggests that a very large percentage of British
citizens believe that people claim benefits fraudulently and seemingly regardless of the
unemployment level at the time. However, we can see empirically, both from the fluctuating
level of unemployment as well as the varying expenditures covering various programs,
including the JSA, that a simple sanity test would infer that it would be impossible for large11
amounts of unemployed individuals to claim benefits fraudulently, or at least one would
expect to see more fluctuation considering that it seems by other survey questions that during
the recent recession there is some legitimacy to being unemployed and collecting benefits.
The final aspect which is looked at specifically in the context of an invisible policy
process is when citizens are unable to make accurate judgments regarding important
programs. Perhaps a lack of information regarding key programs would suggest that citizens
are unable to make clear and sensible opinions regarding whether they support or oppose the
content of those policies. While these questions are rarely asked and hard to find, a recent
article conducted by Public Finance, the magazine arm of the Chartered Institute of Public
Finance and Accountancy, published an article titled “Facts and Fiction on Welfare,” which
addressed that very issue. Utilized internal polling through the CIPFA finds that “Popular
attitudes towards spending on welfare claimants are often based on ignorance and prejudice,

11

Large is probably a poor word selection since it is subjective, however the uniformity of the response might
suggest that while the word is subjective, most people have agreed on its application
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fed by politicians and the media” (Smith 2013). Author Nicola Smith makes this claim after
discussing findings that deviate from public spending facts. The first example of this,
however, shows that “on average, people thought that around two fifths of the entire welfare
budget was spent on unemployed people. In fact, only three percent of expenditure is
accounted for by Jobseeker’s Allowance, while over 50 percent is spent on pensioners”
(Ibid). This is the general theme of this publication being that there is a noticeable disconnect
between what people think and what is the government is actually doing, concluding that
“the polling shows that people can hold completely contradictory positions on benefit
spending. While the public support the government’s plans to cap the uprating of benefits at
one per cent, 63 percent of those polled wanted benefits to link to wages, or prices, or both –
precisely what the government are legislating against” (Smith 2013).

High levels of Political Passivity
If political passivity, as it is discussed as a part of Suzanne Mettler’s model, described in
the previous chapters is to be measured in earnest then it will be important to look
particularly at whether there is any acts of public decent and acute forms of policy protest, or
indeed whether there is positive voting behavior, indicating either public discontent with, or
support for, current policy trends or decisions being made by the UK. In this way, it may be
possible to get a better picture of whether the general public appears to have a major impact
on the direction of social policy decision making as it pertains to social spending and benefits
for the unemployed and in turn unemployed youth over the time of the ongoing recession
which still afflicts the UK economy.
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The United Kingdom, as seen in part 1 of this chapter, has found itself in one of the
deepest recessions and highest levels of recorded unemployment, and specifically youth
unemployment, in the past 20 or 30 years. Despite this, the political parties seem to be taking
one of the most austere approaches to benefits in the past several administrations, taking
what was described earlier as “tough love” stances on benefits programs. The policy
proposals being discussed at the highest level include immanent benefits caps to the
Universal Credit program as well as short term initiatives which actually have the power to
withdraw unemployment benefits from individuals who refuse to accept job offers. Further,
this does not appear to be a partisan position as both the coalition and opposition parties are
taking hardline stances on the need to cut public spending on unemployment benefits and
incentivize people to work rather than “signing on” and staying on welfare benefits
indefinitely. Such party uniformity on one of the most politically charged platforms within
the recession may suggest public uniformity which is demanding political consensus.
However, there is some evidence that could show this is not necessarily the case.
There have been two recent protests and several major protests in the past couple of years
which directly look to showcase rising level of disapproval with the cutting benefits for the
unemployed which affects those who may need the assistance the most. The first of these
protest movements is called UK Uncut, which has become the poster child of “direct action”
protests against government austerity. The movement started in 2010, looking to inform the
public and dispel the myths that the “only way to reduce the deficit is to cut public services”
(ukuncut.org, 2014). This organization has garnered widespread print media attention,
specifically in The Guardian, which has published not only coverage of notable protests
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around the country but also op-ed pieces looking to get behind the scenes with organizers in
order to better cover the message of the group.
UK Uncut has become one of the most active grassroots protest organizations lobbying
for stricter corporate tax laws and less cuts to social assistance programs. To this end, the
Uncut organization has organized 703 public protests since January 15, 2011. Clearly, this is
a public and political voice that is not going away, utilizing common disruptive techniques
such as roadblocks and occupations of public shopping centers. This type of organization
strategy actually stems quite clearly from the other political protest group that has made some
waves in the past few years all over the world, but has had a particular impact in the United
Kingdom. The “occupy movement,” while specifically targeting rising inequalities between
different social classes, has also tailored its message in the UK to include a public critique of
the unequal shape of government tax cuts resulting in major cuts to public spending and
social assistance benefits. The Occupy UK movement has, like the UK Uncut movement,
managed to rally support in every major city in the United Kingdom. However, the occupy
movement has also clearly lost steam while the Uncut movement stands strong. Many of the
organizers of the Uncut movement blame the lack of staying power of the occupy movement
on too many prolonged and exhaustive protest which was bound to lose the energy and
participation that a grassroots protest requires. As such, the ongoing social media outlets of
the occupy movement, including www.occupy.com, regularly supports the Uncut movement
with social media coverage and support.
It is clear that some protest groups appear to be actively protesting the government’s line
on social spending and benefit cuts, however if we recall the first two figures presented in
part 2, section 1 of this chapter, regarding survey data on collective national values and
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spending preferences towards social assistance programs, we saw that not only has the desire
to tax more and consequently spend more gone significantly down since 2002, but
additionally the perception that spending, as it currently happens, is too high and discourages
work, has also gone up in a dramatic fashion from approximately the same year. An
additional survey, conducted by the National Centre for Social Research, published by the
Guardian last summer, asked individuals to itemize their preferences along all of the major
recipients of social assistance, not just those that apply to the unemployment benefits
discussed above.

Figure 4: Social Spending Priorities

The results, as seen above, at least on the surface confirm the results of the earlier
surveys focusing strictly on opinions regarding unemployment spending. As we see, the
support for allocating extra funds to those programs such as the JSA, is the least supported
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area of public spending, not to mention that it has fallen significantly in popularity from the
mid 1990’s. This coincides with political polling conducted by The Guardian as well as by
both political parties showing that “Labour's own pollster James Morris said the party faced a
very severe challenge in overcoming the Conservatives' opinion poll leads on benefit cuts.
He pointed to a TUC survey which showed that 64% of key Labour/Conservative swing
voters backed the government over benefit cuts” (Watt and Clark 2013). These figures
certainly help justify the coalition government’s hardline stance on cutting such benefits
considering the apparent unpopularity of such programs. That being said, there is a sharp
upward change in the trending desire to spend more on unemployment programs during the
time frame when these protest movements began in earnest at the outset of the 2008 global
financial recession. The impacts of these movements are of course nearly impossible to
calculate, however the correlation of these two phenomena may yet give some grounds for
cautioned challenges or acceptance of one of the isolated models over the other.

Assistance Provided Which Violates National Values
The final key to examining whether or not there is any obstructive forces shifting
spending patterns away from those socially desired programs is to look and see if there are
any gaps between where spending is being allocated compared to the survey data dictating
what spending allocation should look like. To this end, there are three programs which
specifically look to target unemployment benefits, with an additional two short term
initiatives set forth to address the pervasive issue of youth unemployment as defined above.
Specifically, in the final section of part 2 of this chapter, there is a comprehensive table of the
different unemployment focused benefits programs and their associated yearly expenditures.
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These figures, while somewhat difficult to completely flush out due to the complicated nature
and multiple targets of those programs, can tell us that on the whole spending has increased
in correlation with rising numbers of unemployed individuals. However, imbedded within the
increases in spending as a percent of GDP, it is important to note the growing number of
restrictions and conditions by which individuals are able to continue to collect social
assistance benefits.
The collective increase in benefits rolled out by the Department of Work and
Pensions particularly seem destined to be short lived when looking at the discussion within
the legislature working to make specific cuts and caps to programs in existence as well as the
increasingly diminishing proportion of social assistance spending allocated to
unemployment programs as a percent of the total UK budget as discussed in the historical
narrative of social spending and social need in part 1 of this chapter. However, in the sum of
the national values surveys conducted both by the British Social Attitudes Survey and the
National Centre of Social Research referenced throughout this analysis of the UK welfare
state, people seem to generally approve limiting available unemployment benefits. This is
clearly the interpretation of both the Conservative and Labour parties who have identified
“tough love policies as popular with the electorate” (Castle 2013).
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Figure 5: Voter Support poll 2010-2014

Source (UK Polling Report 2014) *Red represents Labour party, Blue Conservatives, Yellow Liberal
Dems

We see that in the above table of weekly party support figures that there appears to be
no major swings in support which would suggest discontent with the fairly similar policies
regarding the future of unemployment policies. Thu, despite the small rebounds in social
perceptions on the need to spend more in the last year or so, as well as the confirmed
existence of protest groups against benefit cuts for unemployed youth and adults alike, it
seems that the UK programs in place are in fact giving enough assistance so as not to be
overtly in violation of the national values of the British public. However, there are certainly
distinctions and disagreements in the data which would suggest that the amount of
unemployment spending, representing such a small share of total welfare spending, needs to
be protected as a vital safety net.
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Chapter 4: United States Case Study
Part 1: Introduction to the US Case Study

It is important to note that, in contrast to the modernizing of the UK welfare state which
occurred in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the US welfare state has its roots dug deep in President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal” policies in the post Great Depression America. These
original federal programs, such as Unemployment Compensation (now insurance), as well as
the Aid to Families and Dependent Children act (shortened to AFDC) are programs from the
1930’s which remain two of the hallmark tracks of American aid programs. The two general
paths of American welfare being risk insurance and life cycle entitlements based on
contributions paid into the pool and taken out when needed in the first typology of programs
represented by Unemployment Insurance as well as Old Age and Survivors Insurance. The
other typology of course, is outlined by public assistance programs providing “charity to the
deserving few among the many chiselers… among which the AFDC became the biggest and
most well-known program” (Fraser and Gordon 1994). It was from Great Depressions,
where unemployment and inequality where so rampant, that it necessarily fell to “federal
government welfare programs… to assist the unemployed or underemployed” (“The History
of Welfare” 2014). However, the American welfare state has experienced some major
transformations of over time. In particular, the notion that the two typologies of welfare
programs in the United States have both been moving farther apart with the first type of “top
tier” programs expanding while the second type of “lower tier” programs shrinking and
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becoming stingier. This may not entirely be the case of course, as discussed in the literature
review in chapter one, author Christopher Howard discusses that the reality of the modern
US welfare state is that the lines between those two tiers have blurred significantly in
determining what has grown and what has not.
However, the most important aspect of the evolving welfare state for authors like
Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon are the terms which have become imbedded in defining
welfare “and are also active forces in shaping it” (Fraser and Gordon 1994). In particular, for
many including Fraser and Gordon, the rhetoric has become highly stigmatized and focused
specifically on the term “dependency.” Furthermore, the discussion of welfare programs have
become dependency centric where “policy experts from both major parties agree that welfare
dependency is bad for people, that it undermines their motivation… and accentuates the
underclass mindset and condition” (Fraser and Gordon 1994). This process, particularly
pursued by the conservative administrations of the 1980’s, has been referred to as a campaign
against dependency and permeates all aspects of policy formation, targeting and longevity.
The context of welfare in the US was once defined by efforts to provide social assistance
specifically rooted in providing a safety net for those jobless individuals marginalized by the
marketplace, however as the American welfare state grew, these programs have experienced
many distinctive shifts regarding program targets. In particular, the definition of welfare and
those who receive it has changed in coordination with the transition from Aid to Families and
Dependent Children to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. The
definition of welfare moved from that of the helpless “condition of poor women with
children who maintain families with neither a male breadwinner nor an adequate wage and
who rely for economic support on a government program” to a sense of dependency “as a
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defect of individual character… deeply inflected by gender, race and class” (Fraser and
Gordon 1994, 311,320). It was during this transition from AFDC to TANF which such
entitlements underwent significant downsizes including a maximum of five years of
federally-funded cash benefits as well as fixed state TANF budgets to be divided up between
those collecting benefits. However, in addition to cuts on entitlement benefits, welfare reform
for unemployment programs led to a similar critical image of benefits “There are a lot of
people who abuse unemployment — people who don’t want to go out and get a job. It can be
a burden on taxpayers” (O’Keefe 2014).
This shift in perceptions occurred seemingly simultaneously with a conservative shift
in the UK Thatcher administration. Where the UK endured “the winter of discontent,” the US
mirrored sweeping strikes for federal workers which were broken by then President Ronald
Reagan in incidences such as the PATCO strike in 1981 which affected both the power of
unions in the United States and also represented a shift in attitudes towards jobless. This, in
addition to growing emphasis on the life cycle distribution programs like social security and
Medicare, two programs which dominate the landscape of public spending, represent the shift
towards helping not just those who need help to compete in the market economy but
specifically to groups who are perceived to no longer be able to compete at all such as
children and the elderly. In fact, the social security benefit for retirees more than doubled
between 1995 and 2009 alone, jumping from just shy of $400 million to well over $800
million in expenditures according to official social security annual reports12. Furthermore, the
federal government in a recent congressional research publication for the House Budget
Committee asserts that there are now over 80 welfare programs on the books. However, the
amount of programs which explicitly go to cash benefits or subsidized education or training
12

Can be explored at the dedicated social security website: http://www.ssa.gov/history/tftable.html
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for jobless individuals, as was originally intended for the Keynesian welfare model adopted
by FDR to pursue full employment, is very small as compared to the different disability
allowances or tax credits for economically encouraged behavior such as home ownership. In
fact, Christopher Howard notes this development13 in the US welfare state as programs have
shifted to more tax credits and or refunds rather than outright subsidies and cash based
insurance programs (Howard 2007).
Another key characteristic of the US welfare state, as it is described extensively in the
literature review by Joseph Hacker, is that the US welfare state is one of many different
policy strategies and tools to accomplish the changing roles of social assistance in society. In
particular, the fact that at the federal level, the responsibility of different “welfare programs”
which may be trying to target the same general groups of individuals have been divided
amongst a number of federal agencies. Some such distinct agencies include “the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), the Department of Labor, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of
Education” (Ibid 2014). This, of course, creates logistical problems with both determining
and then measuring the size of the US welfare state, particularly when trying to narrow the
scope to a specific target group such as the unemployed. These programs however, do not
appear to have much in the way of overlap, unlike the UK programs which seem to
constantly consolidate programs and the target groups those programs are meant to impact.
Despite these apparently specific programs, data on program spending is hard to weed out in
any archival publication from the Bureau of Labor Statistics which is in charge of measuring
and accounting for trends in unemployment and the programs such as Federal
Unemployment Insurance as well as the many job training programs administered through
13

See discussion of policy characteristics in Literature review
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the Department of Labor. In response to that, I have decided to initially represent the picture
of spending on these programs through a longitudinal study of pure public spending on
unemployment benefits as a percent of GDP, compiled by the OECD, seen in Table 1 below.
These figures are followed by a chart of total program expenditures from the Employment
and Training Administration.

Table 11: US vs UK public unemployment spending as percentage of GDP
according to OECD

Source: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG#

Table 12: Total Employment and Training Expenditures in millions 19922010
1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

4,555

5,410

4,513

6,837

5,969

6,417

5,566

5,736

4,228

6,320

Source: http://www.doleta.gov/budget/docs/tepbah14.pdf
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However such spending figures seem to mean fairly little to many authors like
Christopher Howard, Suzanne Mettler and Jacob Hacker because spending on programs
described on different reports from institutions such as the National Bureau for Economic
Research, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor’s “National Longitudinal
Surveys” offer conflicting and incomplete data about what amounts of spending is going to
what specific programs in what years, under what circumstances and to what states.
Additionally, those authors know that spending data on programs in sum is not completely
accurate in accounting for federal welfare assistance, particularly since the programmatic
architecture of welfare programs has bifurcated to include both discretionary cash benefit
programs administered by individual federal agencies versus tax credits and tax refunds
administered through the Internal Revenue Service. A table compiled by the non-profit
organization National Priorities Project, which aims to help make the federal budget and
federal spending more transparent, outlines the two types of welfare assistance expenditures
(“Federal Budget 101” 2014). One reason that the shape of welfare distribution is often
obscured in the US context is seeming cyclical role of states in the provision of welfare
programs, which have come full circle, from federalist inspired origins historically
controlling all programs, individual states now play a major role in the modern welfare
process again.
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Table 13: Public program expenditures 2014

Source:(“Federal Budget 101” 2014)

Unemployment Programs
Remembering the complexity and size of the US welfare state discussed above, it
should be noted before I continue, that for the purposes of this discussion, I remain only
interested in federally provided welfare programs. This choice comes as a consequence of the
models which I have chosen to test in this study which focus solely on national values and
national behavior without accounting for federalist systems and state deviations. Thus, I will
be focusing on only the discretionary payment programs of Federal Unemployment
Insurance and President Obama’s revamp of federal jobs training initiatives such as the
“Second Chance” program specifically aimed at high school dropouts and incarcerated youth,
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which is expected to help “as many as 6 million youth under age 24” who now find
themselves unemployed (“Obama Pushes ‘second-chance’ Training” 2014).
Federal Unemployment Insurance is the most general and universal program targeted
at the unemployed which, while it has some state variations, is the most broad program in
that it only disqualifies individuals “for quitting work, being fired for misconduct, or refusing
suitable work” (Department of Labor 2005). Additionally, UI is the only federal
unemployment program which is specifically funded by its own national line item tax called
the Federal Unemployment Tax which floats at a federal minimum of six percent on payroll
income, but allows for individual state additions. All things considered, there are few
limitations or qualification restrictions for federal Unemployment Insurance which simply
“provides temporary cash benefits to individuals who are unemployed through no fault of
their own, so that they can meet their basic financial needs and provide for their families
while searching for new employment” (Ibid 2005). Furthermore, UI has proven to be one
federal program which does have reactionary components called UI extensions which allow
benefits to fluctuate in sync with the state of the economy. These benefits come as a
percentage of previous wages rather than a set entitlement for a number of weeks determined
by Congress to be appropriate with the time frame of the economy. The set number of weeks
under Unemployment Insurance is set at 26 weeks, which was expanded from an initial 13
weeks at the outset of the program in 1935, but has the ability to extend to 99 weeks under
extreme circumstances determined by Congress. There are no universal standards for the
amount of cash benefits in which someone will receive, nevertheless “the average
unemployment benefit was about $300 per week in 2010, 2011, and 2012. [Yet] individual
benefit levels vary greatly depending on the state and the worker’s previous earnings. In
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addition, in several states, workers receive higher benefits if they have dependents” (Stone
and Chen 2013) which is further dependent on the state benefit caps.
Federal jobs training programs have gone in and out of fashion with fairly specific
shelf lives built into programs ever since the relatively unpopular Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act which cost a total of $34 billion dollars at its height in 1980
offering “economically disadvantaged persons training and job opportunities” as part of the
Carter administration’s larger Economic Stimulus Appropriations Act of 1977 (Marshal
1981). However, these training programs under President Carter, which targeted many
different in need groups with a collection of programs, Including the Youth Employment and
Training Program, described by Department of Labor analyst, and former Secretary of Labor
under President Carter, Ray Marshal, as “the most carefully designed attack on the
unemployment problems of a single targeted group ever mounted,” where short lived
initiatives which met their demise due to significant public spending cuts made by the
Reagan administration. More recently, the 1996 welfare to work program spent over $3
billion dollars in grants to families collecting TANF benefits as a subsidy to pursue
secondary education and jobs training programs which failed to regain funding in 2000.
Despite the seemingly rocky road for jobs training programs, President Obama, in his
most recent State of the Union address, announced a $2 billion dollar initiative over the
course of three installments with an initial $475 million in jobs training grants working with
companies to establish programs which will feed directly into jobs.
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Social Need
Similar to the UK case study, the foremost problem that is facing a majority of welfare
states, and indeed large portions of the world, is youth unemployment characterized by those
16-25 year olds that are flooding labor markets without the ability to join the labor force in
the aftermath of the global economic recession in 2008. However, In the US context, another
problem according to a recent Department of Labor study, conducted in coordination with the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) is that “for
the past 25 years, fewer than half of unemployed workers have actually received
unemployment insurance” (Stone and Chen 2013). In particular, this problem, as outlined in
the figure 6 below, requires that in order to collect unemployment insurance in the United
States, individuals must be actively pursuing employment opportunities and find a job within
a set amount of time dictated by Congress, based on the length of time in which benefits will
be given. However, in a dramatic recession such as the one experienced in 2008, two
problems emerged with the Unemployment Insurance program which indicates a particular
struggle that afflicts the 16-24 year old cohort the most. First, when the length of
unemployment becomes greater, seen in figure 7 below, there is a significant drop in labor
force participation as people cease the job search or stop being able to collect UI benefits.
Furthermore, one of the most important limitations regarding unemployment is that you have
had to previously occupy a job and establish a base wage for five quarters, or around a year
and three months, in order to collect any assistance during the job search. This second factor,
in particular, means that during a long term recession the waves of unemployed youth will be
hit particularly hard with a combination of incredibly difficult job searches and no
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unemployment assistance programs to help them pursue the jobs that they need during a
lengthy job search.

Figure 6: US unemployment and Labor Force participation rates 1994-2012
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Figure 7: Average Duration of Unemployment 1947-2014

Furthermore, when examining figures 6 and 7 above; we see that starting in 2008, there
was a sharp increase in unemployment even as the level of individuals who are participating
in the job search, and as such can be counted as unemployed, are in steep decline. In other
words, the true level of unemployment has been much higher than accounted for by US
official measurements. This problem is compounded by the clear time limits imposed by the
Unemployment Insurance program which in some cases have seen people remaining
unemployed for longer than benefits are provided to them which may be a factor in the
increasing level of labor force dropouts. However, though the unemployment data is not
entirely perfect in capturing exactly the amount of jobless individuals in the United States,
looking at the disparity in unemployment rates among the different age groups can highlight
the conclusion made by authors Bell and Blanchflower14 that youth under the age of 24 have
been particularly afflicted with unemployment and need social assistance. As such, Figures 8
14

Discussed at length in UK case study Part 1
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and 9 highlight the unemployment rate of two age groups used to break down the difference
between youth and adult unemployment in the UK case study: the youth cohort of ages 16-24
and the adult cohort of everyone aged 25 and over. It is important to note, however, the
differences in the y-axis with different ceilings of unemployment as a percentage of the
population among the two graphs. In Figure 3, youth unemployment tops out at nearly 20
percent, whereas in a similar looking figure 4, adult unemployment barely moves past 9
percent.

Figure 8: Unemployment rate 16-24 yr old 1947-2014
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Figure 9: Unemployment rate 25 and over 1947-2014

Part 2: Operationalizing Andersen’s Model
National Values
In order to determine the validity of the assumption as it has been applied to the
identification of the United States, like the UK case study above, as a market centric liberal
welfare state, it will be important to again look at the variety of social attitude surveys
conducted both by state and non-state institutions which will help to establish trends and
underlying values which may be at play in the ultimate outcome of determining how the
distribution of social resources are allocated. Since the major issue of youth unemployment,
as seen in the previous section, is the most pervasive threat to the major emerging group of
individuals needing assistance that will not be provided by the free market system or current
unemployment assistance programs, it makes sense to look at as much survey data as
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possible regarding the social opinions as they pertain to providing assistance to this group of
people and the conditions of support for such programs.
Of course, the most basic question to ask when looking at national values of social
assistance and welfare programs is how people view the prospect of welfare spending. These
questions are primarily concerned with how people feel about spending in general. A
common first question on any survey trying to understand perceptions regarding government
spending and welfare is commonly posed by asking participants to choose one of three
statements about their preferred course of action for the government in terms of future
spending. For the General Social Survey Series conducted by National Opinion Research
Center (hereafter referred to as NORC) at the University of Chicago, these statements were
as follows: “Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount
on...welfare?”(General Social Survey 2012).

Figure 10: Average responses 1972-2012

Page | 123

From the figure above, two things are clear: first, as a long term study the averages
hold fair significance despite a lack of access to the year to year deviations among the
different answer choices. Second, it is possible to see a clear gap separating those individuals
who think that the US government spends too much, rather too little, on welfare related
programs, with the former more than doubling the latter over the course of the last 40 years.
Furthermore, questions like this that offer a great basis for understanding and identifying
patterns or inconsistencies in follow up questions such as “welfare15 makes people work less
than they would if there wasn't a welfare system: please tell me whether you strongly agree,
agree, disagree, or strongly disagree” (General Social Survey 2012). Here we see another
synthesized average result as part of a series from 1972-2006.

Figure 11: average response set to: welfare makes people work less than
they would if there wasn't a welfare system. 1972-2006

Source: (General Social Surveys, 1972-2006 [Cumulative File])

This is another common question which is often asked in many types of social survey
studies and will be a key point of national value comparison to the UK case study.
Additionally, it is important to note that nearly 85 percent of 49,550 data points collected in
this survey question has led to a fairly uniformed agreement that welfare benefits indeed
make people work less. An additional survey by the GSS looked at this question slightly
differently in a more recent edition of the same study: “If welfare benefits weren't so
15

This is admittedly not the clearest question and would probably be better off clarifying welfare to mean welfare
benefits.
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generous people would learn to stand on their own two feet” with a response set of 53
percent agreeing and 22 percent disagreeing in 2009 which was up from values 38 percent
agreeing and 34 percent disagreeing in 1999. For authors like Fraser and Gordon, this is in
coordination with the rhetoric of dependency so often used in the way US welfare policy
discourse is discussed, above in Part 1 of this chapter. However, in the same series of
questions, when individuals were asked if “welfare helps people get on their feet when facing
difficult situations such as unemployment: please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree,
disagree, or strongly disagree with it” the responses offer a similar level of agreement, in
figure 12 below, that these programs are indeed helpful.

Figure 12: average response set to: welfare helps people get on their feet
when facing difficult situations such as unemployment. 1972-2006

Source: (General Social Surveys, 1972-2006 [Cumulative File])

This information is telling in that it shows how people view these programs at face
value. However, it is also important to understand what people believe the expense of such
welfare programs are and whether or not those expenditures, which according to the results
above both de-incentivize workers as well as offer a good safety net, create problems and
carry the negative connotations of dependency. In order to accomplish this task we will look
at two more figures, starting with a 2011 CBS News poll in figure 13, looking to understand
what the perception of welfare spending is like among the US populous, followed by a 2013
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survey conducted by Rasmussen Reports in coordination with Pulse Opinion Research on
welfare dependency.

Figure 13.1: Perception of welfare spending as a percent of federal budget
2011
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Figure 13.2: Perception of welfare spending as a percent of federal budget
2011 breakdown by party affiliation

Figure 14: UK vs US General welfare spending as a portion of Federal
Budget According to OECD

Source: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG#

Of course, when comparing the data in figure 13 to the OECD information presented
in figure 14, on what percent of the federal budget is spent on general welfare programs, the
public is largely unaware. In fact, people do not seem to realize how much does get spent on
welfare programs when you include things like social security, tax credits as well as subsidy
benefits like food stamps. However, a better question would have asked what percentage of
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the federal budget is spent on programs like Unemployment Insurance because I believe it is
programs like the UI and TANF and the EITC which people account for when considering
what percentage of the federal budget is spent on those programs. In those cases, I would be
fairly certain in predicting that there would be clear disparities between what people think is
going on and what is actually happening in terms of public spending on these specific
programs. Empirically, federal spending specifically allocated towards Unemployment
Compensation programs never gets above a 1 percent share of GDP at any time in the past
several decades according to the OECD report on public unemployment spending in 2013;
however we do not know what is believed to be spent on these programs by the general
public.
Table 14: US vs UK public unemployment spending as percentage of GDP

Further, a recent 2013 public opinion study published by Rasmussen Reports,
observes that “Americans believe that too many of their fellow citizens are financially
dependent on the government” (“64% Think Too Many Are Dependent on Government Aid”
2013). This is made clear by the results of the survey which asked people whether too much
dependency is generated by current welfare programs, the results of which show that “64%
of American Adults think there are too many Americans dependent on the government for
financial aid” (Ibid, 2013). While only 25 percent disagree and 11 percent are unsure as to
how much dependency is created. In other words, even amidst a deep recession, there is a
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lack of legitimacy for US unemployed adults as mirrored in the GSS question regarding
incentive to work less.

Support within the Legislature
Going back to examine the Andersen model, as it was laid out in the second and third
chapters of this study, the importance of the legislative process is highlighted as barometer
for Anderson. In particular, Andersen views the role of the legislator to be the intermediary,
between the general populous and the end result of policies delivered by the federal
government, which in theory would legitimize and refract the values expressed by society
into the aforementioned policy decisions and how they are ultimately made. Now that we
have examined the values imbedded in surveys, we can now examine the political discussion
in the media to examine what is happening on the leading edge of legislative discourse.
In general, of course, political discourse between the two parties is often seen as
polarized between the Democratic and Republican parties. Indeed, “an extensive body of
research in comparative political economy demonstrates that Left and Right governments
make different policy choices with a good deal of consistency” (Pontusson and Raess 2012,
28). In this context there has been a significant deal of disagreement within the discourse
between the parties in determining adequate responses to the economic downturn and the fate
of unemployment benefits in particular. Emily Cartridge of Congressional Quarterly
describes the problem: “Congress seems stuck trying to balance economic priorities”
(Ethridge 2010). The key for the Democratic Party is that they believe “Unemployment
Compensation is one of the easiest ways to stimulate the economy because recipients are
more likely to spend the money rather than save it, lubricating the economy” (Harrison and
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Ota 2013). Additionally, there is the sense that cutting off benefits too soon will not only
prevent individuals from accessing the necessities such as access to food and shelter, but that
these cuts will create an even greater lag in the economic downturn.
On the other side of the isle however, “many Republicans oppose spending the
money” (Harrison and Ota 2013). In particular, this is the line of argument being offered by
the general populous of the GOP who claim not to be opposed to the idea of some state
benefits to the unemployed and particularly so during times of major recession, however, the
federal UI program has been extended 8 times since 2008 and “there’s a feeling that it has
gone on for a long, long time, and it can’t continue” (Ibid 2013). In essence, the Republicans
feel that it is time they draw a line in the sand, and actually did so by blocking further
extensions proposed in President Obama’s 2014 Fiscal Budget thus allowing emergency
benefits to run out as of December 31st 2013. The reasoning for this strong opposition being
that such ongoing provisions “reduce pressure on unemployed people to find, work and it
adds to government spending at a time when the debt is soaring at record levels…. This is a
battle about helping the people that need our help today without hurting the children of
tomorrow” (Ethridge 2010).
However simple the Republicans argument may seem, Democrats including President
Obama, have continued to question their motives as well as openly criticized the Republican
Party after it blocked extensions to the Unemployment Insurance in the budget at the end of
last year saying, “Instead of punishing families who can least afford it, Republicans should
make it their New Year’s resolution to do the right thing” (Baker 2014). The Democratic
position has been “renewing their calls for extensions of unemployment benefits… during
every recession since the 1950’s” (Benson 2008). Additionally, Obama has been pushing
Page | 130

hard to pressure major businesses to sign an executive memo to not discriminate against the
long term unemployed and indeed promote specific training programs run by businesses and
funded by the Department of Labor with a guarantee of job placement upon the successful
completion of such programs. In response to the Republic adage throughout this debate
saying “the fight is mostly about the money” (Harrison 2011) the Democrats have responded
by saying that extensions are about the “more than 6.5 million people who said they had been
out of work for more than 6 months or longer, [which is] double the number at the low point
from the last severe recession in 1981-1982” (Ethridge 2010).
Nevertheless, the Republicans seem unwilling to budge, and as such, have been
blamed for an “opposition and a lack of urgency” which has prevented progress in “jobless
benefits from moving forward… after a protracted and ultimately fruitless partisan struggle”
(Benson 2008). Ironically however, authors such as Christopher Howard in his book “The
Welfare State Nobody Knows,” points out that the political discourse in the United States is
hardly ever as clear cut as people may perceive. He notes that many of the largest
expansions, both in terms of eligibility and benefits, of welfare programs like the EITC and
Medicaid happened under the Reagan Presidential administration. Regarding the issues of
unemployment and welfare spending, “some Republicans, including Speaker John A.
Boehner of Ohio, are open to renewing the benefits as long as the cost can be offset” (Baker
2014). As seen above however, it is clear that this may not be the case for many of the
Republican Party, considering recent vocal opposition from members such as Rand Paul, to
the new unemployment bill with arguments that extend beyond economic conservatism to
both moral and philosophical grounds saying “benefits are a narcotic for the unemployed,
lulled by handouts away from seeking work”(Weisman 2014).
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In this regard, it would seem that the actions against emergency Unemployment
Insurance extensions speak louder than the words and the experience of Speaker Boehner’s
words of potential compromise. Of course, one question is always going to be: do the
Republicans need to compromise away from their growing opposition of big federal
programs? According to “Aaron Carroll of Indiana University,” the impression given to the
Republican GOP by the populous voting block is no, “residents of the 10 states Gallup ranks
as most conservative received 21.2 percent of their income in government transfers, while the
number for the 10 most liberal states was only 17.1 percent”(Krugman 2012). Of course, it is
worth noting that there is a common understanding that the poorest states, which are
receiving a majority of government benefits, also happen to be the most conservative. To be
clear, it would be wrong to assume that the poor are voting for the Republican party based on
their welfare policy agenda, but rather this block is often linked to issues of religion and
State’s rights. However, that being said, a recent video documentary series and related article
published by the New York Times titled “Even Critics of Safety Net Increasingly Depend on
It,” shows that a disconnect does exist for many of the elderly and poor in these states which
are state dependents, yet elect extreme conservatives, and in the case of Lindstrom,
Minnesota, a Tea Party representative running on the “promise to cut government spending”
(Appelbaum and Gebeloff 2012). It is no secret then why members of the Republican Party
like Rick Santorum and Mitt Romney claim “President Obama is getting America hooked on
the narcotic of dependency… fostering passivity and sloth”(Krugman 2012).
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Benefits Provided
Now we have laid the framework of the Andersen model, including an account of the
national values, as well as the political discourse regarding the issues of youth
unemployment, and in particular the cost of unemployment assistance programs across all
ages, in the United States. It is finally time to look at what is actually happening within these
welfare programs discussed within the contextual narrative segment of this chapter in order
to make sense of whatever relationships may exist between the earlier operationalized
variables and Andersen’s dependent variable looking at what benefits are being provided. In
figure 15 below, I have laid out the expenditure report on the single most important cash
transfer program targeting the unemployed; Unemployment Insurance.
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Figure 15: Unemployment Insurance transfers in millions 1980-2013
Year

UI expenditure in
millions

1980

18,051

1990

18,889

1992

39,466

1994

28,729

1996

24,898

1998

22,070

2000

23,012

2002

53,267

2004

44,994

2006

33,814

2008

45,340

2009

122,537

2010

160,145

2011

120,556

2012
2013

93,771
82,618

Source: Government printing office, federal government outlays 1962-2018

*grey represents beginning of 2008 recession
Looking at the above expenditures, one thing is immediately clear, spending on the
unemployment compensation benefits has gone up fairly significantly starting in about 1990
and then explosively in the most recent recession starting with the gap between 2008 and
2009. Of course, there are some historical contexts regarding the unemployment rate which
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may help clarify some of the data above and can be seen for the second time below in figure
16.
Figure 16: US unemployment and Labor Force participation rates 1994-201216

In particular, it is important to note how the time frames align between the
unemployment rate and the correlated spending that would logically follow it. For instance,
we see in the early 2000’s, the unemployment rate in red is going up, even as the
participation rate in the labor force is going down17, which nicely corresponds with a hike in
unemployment benefits being distributed. Again, during the financial crisis we see the
unemployment rate cross the participation rate, indicating high unemployment and conditions
which are driving the discouraged unemployed out of the labor force faster than the rising
16
17

See Figure 6 for reference information, page 105
This is a big indicator that there are higher levels of jobless individuals then the Unemployment rate is showing.
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unemployment rate which acts as an obstruction to understanding the true levels of jobless
individuals in need of assistance. However, there is quite a significant explosion in spending
on the UI program. This was due to the explosion in the sub category of emergency
unemployment compensation, otherwise known as the extensions piled on by Congress.
During 2010 and 2011, the emergency spending actually surpassed the amount of spending
allocated through the basic program itself. Thus, when people started running out of the 47
week extension initially approved by the Obama administration until the beginning of 2014
expired for some people, it is clear that both the unemployment rate and spending levels
began to sharply decline around 2012 and 2013. However, the participation rate in the labor
force continues to fall at a steady rate which suggests that not all of the people who are no
longer being counted as unemployed and receiving UI have found jobs.
Another point of reference to put the spending dollar amounts in perspective is the
OECD table, representing the percent of the federal budget spent on unemployment
compensations, displayed in the previous section of this chapter. That table shows that even
during the beginning of the recession in 2009, when expenditures skyrocketed, the various
unemployment programs including UI never accounted for more than 1 percent of the federal
budget. Lastly, the recent youth jobs training initiatives proposed by President Obama, are
short term grant programs with no year to year funding data and allocations disbursed among
numerous programs which hold no place of significance in the Department of Labor or
Department of Education which the programs are being channeled.
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Part 3: Operationalizing Mettler’s Model
Organized Narrow Interests
Organized interests are usually inferred to mean unions or business lobbies which are
able to use collective resources in order to have a voice in the policy making process.
However, in the United States, the power of organized unions is generally considered to have
significantly diminished since the Reagan administration, which in the handling of the
PATCO strike was seen to “strip employees of collective bargaining rights” and power for
the decades to follow (Mccartin 2011). Thus, it is really the purpose and goal of this variable
to measure whether or not business organizations are able to establish unequal representation
in the policy making process, and in doing so, forward specific policy interests. For elite
theorist writers such as Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, focus on the power and impact of
business advocacy groups as being the primary winners of the labor versus business interest
struggle. Furthermore, authors including Richard Farnsworth, note that measuring elite
influence happens in two major avenues; elites use their well-funded organizations to exert
unmatched monetary influence through campaign finance and general lobbying finance or
they utilize their elite connections in order to generate less formal access to important actors
within the policy making process. In the context of the United States there are several major
actors who apply both forms of influence and thus are considered to hold a major place in the
policy agenda atmosphere. Such organizations include the US Chamber of Commerce, the
National Association of Realtors, the Business Roundtable and the National Federation of
Independent Businesses.
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However, before talking specifically about these groups and how different theorists
have measured their influence, it is important to briefly discuss why it is that these organized
interests have become increasing synonymous with organized business interests in the
comparative public policy literature. Jonas Pontusson and Damian Raess particularly address
this discussion by simply highlighting specific indicators of union power over the course of
three different recessions in order demonstrate the “decline of organized labor since the
1980’s… [and] the growing economic and political power of finance” (Pontusson and Raess
2012, 15). In particular, the argument is made that “shifts in the interests and power of
economic actors must be taken into account” to explain broad changes in policy patterns
(Ibid 2012, 15). These accounts of social power and influence are best identified in times of
crisis which demand policy change thus we can look at some specific figures of union
density18 across several decades and economic downturns in figure 17 below.

Figure 17: Union Density major OECD countries 1980, 2007

Source: (Pontusson and Raess 2012, 17)

As we can see, the fall of unions was a particular aspect of deindustrialization and
globalization since the 1980’s which many theorists, including Pierson and Hacker, say have

18

Union density is merely a measure of the Union Participation rate in the labor force
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allowed business interests to win out as the key policy players. However, for elite theorists
this conclusion is not all too easily arrived at, as discussed at length in Pierson and Hacker’s
article,19 “Winner Takes All.” In particular, they recognize that “unions and corporations are
hardly mentioned… [just as] the regime of policy arrangements that structure the political
economy are essentially invisible” (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 167). For them, it is apparent
within the drastically rising inequality pervasive in the American context, and particularly
with regard to risk compensation and general social transfer programs, business elites have
cornered the policy making process “with unique capacities to reward and punish” decision
making actors far more significantly than the median voter.
How this gets accomplished returns us to the discussion of the bifurcated measures of
financial power and unequal access, as they apply to the capacity of the business advocacy
groups listed above to influence the policy process. The first indication of money spent,
which leads to this list of “heavy hitters” above, comes from the Center for Responsive
Politics which is a watchdog organization that publishes its findings under the webpage name
opensecrets.org. In particular, they have identified the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
National Association of Realtors as the top two lobby organizations in terms of financial
outlays as seen below in figure17. Further, Open Secrets shows us that the amount of
lobbying monies present in the political process has more than doubled in just the last 15
years, as business organizations place higher financial stakes and investments on potentially
favorable policy outcomes. One explanation for this uptrend of financial lobbying efforts is
given by Professor Jennifer Victor from George Mason University who explains in her paper,
“Gridlock Lobbying: Breaking, Creating, and Maintaining Legislative Stalemate,” that the
19

Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. 2010. Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer--and
Turned Its Back on the Middle Class. Simon & Schuster.
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persuasion oriented level of influence becomes much more important during times of
gridlock where non-decisive actors will have a better chance of influencing the few key
political actors to alter policy outcomes (Victor 2012). This sentiment is reinforced by
Pierson and Hacker who believe that the real measure of changing business power is the
simultaneous lack of specific reform to the programs because “these groups have the ability
to block change and effectively resist the updating of policy over an extended period of time
in the face of strong contrary pressure and strong evidence that policy is failing to achieve its
initial goals… a process known as policy drift” (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 168). Thus, it is
clear for Pierson and Hacker that not only is lobby spending increasing in times of gridlock,
but that in part, gridlock is a function of business lobby efforts to create polarization which in
turn favors policy drift which “helps the cause of those who wish to block reform… and has
encouraged the rise of winner-take all” policies (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 171).

Figure 18: Top Ten Influential Organizations by Money Spent 2013
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Figure 19: Total Lobby Money and Lobbyists Recorded by Senate Office of
Public Records 1998-2013

Source: http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php

Looking at the tables above, we see that not only is the Chamber of Commerce the
single biggest lobby group, contributing more than a quarter of the total money spent, but
also that this broad base organization “representing the interests of more than 3 million
businesses of all sizes, sectors, and regions” (“About the U.S. Chamber” 2014) are the
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greatest contributors in a time of major recession. However, it is not just the amount of
money that these groups spend that makes them significant players in the policy making
environment, or as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce claims, the “voice of business interests in
Washington, D.C.” (Ibid 2014). In fact all of these organizations have some similar message
of special access and influence on the headlines of their websites. The NFID argues that the
significant share of economic impact created from member activities means that “lawmakers
have a special obligation to ensure that public policies help spur economic growth by taking
into account the unique perspective of those who are owning and operating a small business
in America” (NFID 2014) which is done through the active media campaigns and public
policy reports generated by its very own research institute. Furthermore, the Business
Roundtable emphasizes that it is an organization, not of businesses, but rather “an association
of chief executive officers of leading U.S. companies working to promote sound public
policy and a thriving U.S. economy” (Business Roundtable 2014) The leaders of elite
companies like AT&T, Meyers, and Walmart which collectively represent “7.4 trillion
dollars in annual revenues” as part of the Business Roundtable use the collective voices of
business elites to “successfully penetrate noneconomic institutions such as public agency
advisory panels” (Useem 1979) which gives them further access to present internally
generated policy opinions and reports on core issues.
As for what the results of these efforts being made actually are, it is clear at least that
the Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Businesses have
taken a vocal opposition to the extension of unemployment insurance as well as “supports
eliminating the Federal Unemployment Tax (FUTA) “surtax,” lowering the FUTA tax and
returning the unemployment insurance system to the states” (NFIB 2014). While the big
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business interests of the Business Roundtable has focused specifically on the jobs training
initiatives of the President Obama, such as the new $2 billion initiative discussed in his State
of the Union address which included grants channeled through the Department of Labor
which “would direct $150 million to partnerships (training programs run by companies) that
help workers develop needed skills” in addition to proposed Workforce Investment Act
reforms which would allow for community college programs to meet specific business needs
as dictated by business input.

Invisible Policy Process
As was discussed in the theory and methods chapter above, one of the crucial
variables for Suzanne Mettler’s model of state social policy behavior is what she finds to be
the presence of, or lack of, an invisible policy process which obstructs the reality of policy
decisions being made. This will in turn pacify the general public and allow the previously
discussed organized business interests to dominate within policy decision making at the
highest level without competition. In other words, “vibrant democracy requires that citizens
possess the inclination and capacity to take action… visible policies have the potential to
enhance individuals’ disposition to become involved… submerging the state inculcates
passivity and resentment” (Mettler 2011, 27). For the most part, this is measured by
individual’s experiences and perceptions of their experiences with welfare programs and
what programs are providing benefits to whom.
Mettler, being concerned with the study of this phenomenon in the U.S. context
conducted her own study and own compilation of survey data which would be silly to ignore
in this study. To this point, Mettler was concerned with what she deemed to be an invisible
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policy process built into the system of social assistance programs in the United States but did
not limit scope, as I have done, to the focus on unemployment programs and initiative. As
such, the data she provides will be more generally focused on people’s interaction with the
welfare state as a whole, but with room for analogy and extension to findings regarding the
specific unemployment policy issues. The types of questions that are meant to get at the heart
of the visibility-invisibility problem for Mettler are twofold in nature with two stages of
question and answer interviews which revolve around the concept of asking question
followed by the presenting of policy specific information and then asking that same question
again. Thus, invisibility is simply measured in the deviation between the results of questions
as well as simply analyzing how much information is available to individuals in the initial
decision making process. Such questions are meant to be basic in nature and ask individuals:
“Do you favor or oppose the federal Earned Income Tax Credit” or “Do you favor or oppose
the Home Mortgage Interest Tax Deduction” as the first type of question, while the other
investigates personal experiences, asking about personal incomes and party preferences in
order to determine if information played a role in how people vote and whether people vote
in keeping with preferences to programs that they might be participants of. The difference in
question appearance is shown below in figure 20 and 21. The results from questions on three
different programs with different distributive qualities, before and after information is given,
can be found in Figure 21.
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Figure 20: Question on Earned Income Tax Credit with information on
distributive qualities.

Figure 21: Results for question on Earned Income Tax Credit
Answers

%Favor

%Oppose

%Don’t
Know

Pre information
Post information
% Change

52.6
75.3
+22.7

15.1
15.8
+.7

32.4
9
-23.4

Source: Mettler 2011, 57

What we see above is that “in the case of the EITC, once people realized that it
actually helps low income people, support grew by a full 22.7 percentage points” (Mettler
2011, 58). Further responses to other questions show similar results in that when people are
presented with specific policy information, the people who have no opinion rapidly decreases
and “once informed of policy effects, were inclined to articulate policy preferences that
favored the less well-off” (Ibid 2011, 65).
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Of course, data which comes to similar conclusions regarding the inconsistent way in
which the general public are generating opinions on different policy support and political
parties that do not align with their own beliefs is not unique to Mettler, a seen if we look back
to the media analysis on support within the legislature in part 2 of this chapter. There Paul
Krugman, writing for the Ney York Times, provides an empirical analysis showing that
“residents of the 10 states Gallup ranks as most conservative received 21.2 percent of their
income in government transfers, while the number for the 10 most liberal states was only
17.1 percent” (Krugman 2012) when we know additionally that the conservative party has a
strong moral, and as such, political opposition against supporting these social transfer
programs which provide assistance to their voting base.

High levels of Political Passivity
If political passivity as it is discussed as a part of Suzanne Mettler’s model, described in
the previous few chapters, is to be measured in earnest then it will be important to look
particularly at whether there is any acts of public decent and acute forms of policy protest, or
indeed whether there is positive voting behavior, indicating either public discontent with, or
support for, current policy trends or decisions being made by the U.S. government. In this
way, it may be possible to get a better picture of whether the general public appears to have a
major impact on the direction of social policy decision making as it pertains to social
spending and benefits for the unemployed, and in turn, unemployed youth over the time of
the ongoing recession which still afflicts the U.S. and global economies.
Looking to the media, it is certainly hard to overlook the occupy movement, as the most
public and clear form of basic protest to the plight of the unemployed and high levels of
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inequality now imbedded within U.S. society. However, at least in the United States, there
are no real comparative acts of public dissent as seen throughout the European Union
according to Alejandro Chafuen, a contributor to Forbes magazine, writing on the outlook of
youth unemployment in the U.S. as the “21 percent of unemployed youth is fast approaching
the average youth unemployment rate in Europe which stands at approximately 24 percent”
(Chafuen 2013). However, a lack of public protest does not mean the lack of activism in the
U.S. as many youth unemployment activists have taken to organizing on the internet and
airways of social media according to Dan Tapscott in his recent Huffington Post article titled,
“The World's Unemployed Youth: Revolution in the Air.”
In the U.S. the key players in the fight against youth unemployment are grassroots; crowd
sourced and group funded organizations such as the Young Invincibles, Fix Young America,
The Campaign for Young America and Mobilize.org. Hannah Seligson, in the New York
Times article, “The Jobless Young Find Their Voice,” describes these groups: “In a way,
they are the younger siblings of Occupy Wall Street, but with a nonpartisan agenda, more
centralized leadership and one specific mission: to help young people find jobs”(Seligson
2012). In fact, these groups operate basically as think tanks and special interest groups
according to their respective websites “to offer prescriptions for solving youth
unemployment” (Ibid 2012). Rather than fighting the perceived lack of representation and
government responsiveness to the issue of youth unemployment, as well as the resulting
youth poverty issues, with posters and protests, these groups are publishing policy briefs and
forwarding a unified, all be it social media based, political campaign.
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Assistance Provided Which Violates National Values
The final key to examining whether or not there are any obstructive forces shifting
spending patterns away from those socially desired programs is to look and see if there are
any gaps between where spending is being allocated compared to the survey data dictating
what spending allocation should look like. To this end, there is only one program of
particular note which specifically looks to target the unemployed and provide assistance
during the job search in the United States: Unemployment Insurance, albeit with room for
additional emergency add on programs such as Emergency Compensation benefits. This
program, coupled with an additional few short term jobs training initiatives, set forth to
address the pervasive issue of youth unemployment, as defined above in the final section of
part 1 of this chapter, leaves us a good place to start.
In particular, Figure 14 on page 113 shows the yearly expenditures for the UI
program and the significant upward trends therein. These figures, while somewhat difficult to
completely flush out due to the complicated nature of the way in which UI is allocated to
individuals across differing time frames, as well as the in flow and out flow of who is
actually counted as unemployed in the system, can tell us that on the whole spending has
increased in correlation with rising numbers of unemployed individuals when compared to
figure 15. However, imbedded within the increases in spending as a percent of GDP, it is
important to note the growing opposition to further extending how long and how supportive
cash transfer programs can be, thus limiting what individuals are able to collect as social
assistance benefits, even in times of recession, and what expert labor economists such as
Robert Reich have coined as a jobless economic recovery in his recent documentary,
“Inequality For All.”
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That being said, a recent study on American preferences of wealth distribution and
redistribution in society conducted by M. I. Norton and D. Ariely shows that these opinions
on legitimacy and social transfers may not be wholly cut and dry in U.S. More to the point,
they conclude that many individuals may not actually know what they want, let alone what
they are getting from the social policies that they support. In figure 17 below, we see three
choices of different arrangements of social wealth maintained by established government
policies, from which individuals in a survey where asked to choose preferences. One
represented perfectly egalitarian values, one was a representation of Swedish distributions,
with the last being the visual distribution of wealth in the United States.

Figure 22: Choosing ideal systems of social transfers in Welfare State

Source:(Ariely 2012)
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Looking to the visual representation of different allocations of wealth distribution above
in figure 22, these results show peoples preferences, when given the option to dictate their
ideal wealth distribution in the United States, in the solid black bar. The striped bar shows
what people believe the distribution of wealth is in the United States, which for many is
significantly more than what they would want. Finally however, we see that not only is there
significantly more inequality than what people want, the real distribution of wealth in the
white bar is almost twice as lopsided as people predicted. In other words, there is data which
shows people disproportionately want more egalitarian allocations of wealth in the United
States. This data does seem to present some support for Mettler, who argues that people want
more social redistribution than occurs in the United States, but that entrenched invisibility
within the policy process prevents people from understanding how unequal things are.
Authors like Ariely present key data which suggests that people in the United States, when
given better information, may in fact hold much more egalitarian values than the current
welfare programs suggest.
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Chapter 5: Analysis
In examining the welfare systems of the United Kingdom and the United States, certain
patterns of behavior and programs have appeared. However, the most important aspect of this
study has shown empirically that youth unemployment is similarly dire among both the UK
and the U.S. We have seen in the results sections above, that “in the UK, young people aged
16 to 24 accounts for about 40 percent of all unemployed, which means almost 1 million
young adults are jobless… and in the US it's 21 percent” (“The World’s Unemployed Youth:
Revolution in the Air?” 2011). Further still, the comparable relationship with growing youth
unemployment as an economic and policy issue for both these states has given solid
grounding to comparing the power of the models chosen to explain the policy actions in
response to this significant issue.

Andersen
Andersen among many others including Cinalli and Giugni, authors of “New challenges
for the Welfare State: The emergence of youth unemployment regimes in Europe,” have
determined national values are the crucial point of reference for identifying different
typologies of welfare states. Indeed, many theorists including Andersen have generally
identified the United Kingdom and the United States as members of the liberal welfare state
cluster. The characteristics of which are laid out clearly in Andersen’s “Three Worlds of
welfare Capitalism,” where he describes such values to be a system “in which means tested
assistance and modest social-insurance plans predominate” (Andersen 1990, 26). In
particular, the idea of modest or minimal social transfers of wealth between classes is one
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predominant idea which Andersen picks up on as a he concludes that the liberal welfare state
is a market-centric model of social redistributions of resources. This means, as is discussed
above, that the liberal welfare state tends to be one that is far less intrusive and generously
redistributive in its nature, and as such, in its legislation. In essence, there is an assumption
that countries grouped into the market centric model will only allow for redistributions when
the market fails to provide the minimal quality of life expected by society and the constructed
values therein.
This means empirically that their welfare systems should be seen to have a
particularly intimate relationship with market forces, and as such, we would expect its
provisions of social insurance from the state to be limited. This classification further pairs
these states as necessarily having similar behavior both in their national values, and as a
result, similar benefits programs endorsed by the legislature to provide similar levels of
assistance. Andersen asserts that this ontological understanding of spending priorities and
desirable targets of social assistance will help anyone understand and predict how states will
make decisions and legislate aid distribution. Here again we can look at his model as a
reference point to understand the causal process: where he believes that all such variables
ought to move in the same direction as a clear map to understand how and why different
societies with different social values of welfare arrive at different systems of social
assistance prescriptions.
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United Kingdom Results
Specifically with regard to the classification of the United Kingdom as a generally
more stingy and market centric “liberal” welfare state; Andersen explicitly predicts that the
United Kingdom will express national values which devalues state intervention to anyone,
with the exception of those who cannot participate in the market. There is definitely
indications in the survey data used that these trends are present, specifically as we looked at
sharp rises in perceptions that the current benefits system are “too high and discourage
work.” However, it is apparent when looking at all the data available in chapter 3, that it is
evident that these patterns have significant shifts towards greater and greater distaste for
government redistribution as well as a negative image of the plight of the unemployed with a
majority of people agreeing that “most unemployed people could find a job if they really
wanted one” and “most of the people on the dole (slang for state benefits) are fiddling about
in one way or another.” This basic shift to the right, and more conservative, is apparent both
in the in the reversal of preferences with regard to increasing taxes in order to bolster social
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spending as well as a major conservatism shift in the viewpoint of the Labour Party on the
role of government in redistributing income. However, it is certainly worth noting that all
these generally right shifted trends came about fairly abruptly in every study between 1995
and 1998, which leads me to conclude that something certainly happened in the mid 1990’s
which has played out in the form of anti-egalitarian values and a particular distrust of those
collecting assistance from the state. Nevertheless, it is clear that when compared to other
OECD countries, there is the sense that the UK has a generally stingier welfare system, and
the evidence from the survey data collected is that the citizens support a shift towards
becoming even stingier.
Moving on to the analysis of political support within the legislature, the pattern seems
to be continuing. In particular the legislative discourse, as it was measured through the
media’s lens, has seemed to shift fairly significantly towards the conservative Tory platform,
which ironically has become slightly more liberal over the past few decades, as we can see in
the figure below, which mirrors one taken from the national values section in chapter 3.
Furthermore, the dialogue seems to mirror, as Andersen would have predicted, the national
values which are increasingly in favor of creating more formal restraints on welfare
programs. This can be seen in both parties’ platforms, but particularly in for Labour Party
officials like Rachel Reeves who fear “Labour will be punished by voters if it is seen to be
too focused on opposing cuts, particularly cuts to benefits” (Helm 2013). This is a definite
shift in the policy dialogue which does at least appear to be moving parallel to those shifts in
national values, and as such, carry some weight particularly in this time of crisis, which
would in theory have given some legitimacy to the benefits programs which the populous and
the elected officials seem increasingly opposed to. Below we see the chart of populous values
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on social redistribution, found first in chapter 3, which when put next to the policy language
found in chapter 3, offers powerful parallels between shifts in social values and those shifts
in values found in the legislative discourse. Andersen would undoubtedly celebrate such
parallels as proof of the power of his chosen variables.

As for the dependent variable within Andersen’s explanatory framework, the pattern
gets a little bit murkier. For instance, looking at the spending data from the Department of
Works and Pensions, which controls all of the social transfer programs affecting both the
specific group of unemployment benefits, as well as the general population of welfare
recipients, we see that spending has actually doubled in the last 15 years. That being said, the
programs which make up the total expenditures targeted towards unemployment benefits
across all age groups, has grown at a rate much slower than the total expenditures of all DWP
programs. In fact, the total portion the DWP budget which is devoted to the Job Seekers’
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Allowance20 has dropped from .0355 percent of the total outlays to .0312 percent of the
outlays, which is startling considering the massively increased amount of people on the JSA
during the ongoing economic recession. Additionally, it is worth noting that there are
government plans to consolidate many of these programs, which they have already begun
doing in the form of the Universal Credit, in order to make clearer who is receiving what
benefits as well as establish more stringent checks on recipients including benefits caps and
more structured requirements like forced community service in order to remain on programs
for extended periods of time.

United States results
As for the United States, working our way through the results of the Andersen
framework, we can start by noting that there are some misconceptions regarding what
spending is actually occurring. In particular, the ideas about what percentage of general
welfare expenditures on all programs comes from the federal budget is significantly
underestimated by a major portion of the population. While these misconceptions are not
measures of national values, it does offer us some context for understanding why people may
hold the positions they do. Specifically, a majority of people on average have agreed with
statements which paint unemployment compensation programs as being too generous and are
to be blamed for increased unemployment as well as the increasing length of time which
people are unemployed. In general, there is a negative view of such benefits which is
consistent with the writings of Fraser and Gordon on the increased perception of welfare
dependency. It is important to note however, that in their “genealogy of dependency” in the
20

The JSA is essentially the UK equivalent to Unemployment Insurance in the US context
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U.S. welfare state, they blame political rhetoric and the media for these growing negative
perceptions of benefit programs which would mean that the direction of influence would be
the opposite of what Andersen predicts with political support influencing national values.
As for the political discourse in the United States, it too is not as clear as the UK in
terms of the clearly demonstrating movement in any one direction. In fact, the political
discourse is marked by clear polarization between the two major parties. President Obama
leads the democratic platform, clearly supporting and generating initiatives to address not
only unemployment, but also youth unemployment, The Republicans, on the other hand,
have been blamed for blocking extensions to emergency unemployment compensation
programs, both on the platform that the federal government cannot afford such expenditures
as well as the ideological position that welfare benefits creates a system of dependence and
entrenches negative behaviors of laziness in those who able to spend any length of time on
assistance programs that are not directly linked to disabilities or life-cycle redistributions.
Because of the disagreement and lack of clear political support one way or another, it is hard
to make a clear judgment as to which direction the political support within the legislature is
moving, however, authors like Pierson and Hacker who have been cited throughout this
study, have made the conclusion that the political gridlock has, in fact, moved the political
discourse much farther towards the conservative line because it is much easier to block
policy change than it is to push forward either new initiatives or reforms for current policies.
In this way, I feel confident in at least determining that the patterns of political support
within the legislature in not overtly moving against those patterns of national values
discussed above. As such, Andersen’s model retains more strength in that there is not a
contradicting pattern in his causal pathway.
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As for the dependent variable of the programs, which are actually enacted and
supported, things appear to be a bit clearer. For one thing, we can see that there has been a
massive increase in spending on unemployment compensation during the crisis, as well as
eight separate extensions of benefits passed by congress since 2008 and only just ran out on
December 31st 2013. In this way, we could make the judgment that the U.S. has been fairly
responsive to the plight of the unemployed during this most recent recession despite
whatever the national value survey data might tell us about the supposedly stingy U.S.
society which might not support such a drastic upswing of expenditures. However, it is
important to caution these findings by giving credit to the writings of Jonas Pontusson and
Damien Raess, which note the effects of different administrations on different policy
outcomes saying “there can be little doubt that the Obama administration pursued more
expansionary policies in 2008-2010 than a Republican administration would have done”
(Pontusson and Raess 2012, 28). Furthermore, we also know that an increasing number of
unemployed people were not receiving any unemployed benefits at all because they were
either in party time positions or simply gave up looking for a job and did not meet the strict
search requirements required to continue collecting unemployment insurance. So in short, the
raw data tells us that the generosity of the U.S. programs has gone up, against what Andersen
would predict in his model, but under the surface it appears that there are some patterns and
indications of stinginess which may yet save the explanatory power of Andersen’s chosen
variables.
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Points of comparison
In stepping back and looking at how the Andersen model works to help explain the
behavior of the UK and U.S. welfare states there are several interesting similarities and some
potentially key differences which highlight the strengths and weaknesses of this particular
analytical framework. First of all, it can be said there is some strength in the simplicity of the
model, which seems to do a somewhat good job in capturing the general patterns of welfare
behavior over the past several decades, as seen in this comparative graph below, measuring
the average generosity of unemployment compensation programs for five core OECD
countries. The core take away however, which is highlighted somewhat in the dependent
variable responses for both the UK and the U.S., is that these two countries had fairly
radically different responses to the economic crises despite similarities in their national
values. This is slightly problematic because at the very least it shows limits to the
explanatory power of the Andersen Causal Chain in times of economic crises.
These inconsistencies can be seen when we compare the similarly anti-welfare
spending survey results in the national values section. Then we see one political dialogue
with essentially political consensus mirroring the consensus in the survey data of the UK
with regard to anti-welfare spending. Whereas the U.S. political dialogue was anything but a
consensus which shows a sharp contrast between the survey data collected and the political
discourse ongoing. Finally the UK appeared to follow through with decreasing generosity in
its welfare programs which is again shown below graph 1 below. On the other hand, we have
the U.S. by all appearances breaking away and moving in the opposite direction predicted by
Andersen’s model and becoming notably more generous than expected during this most
recent financial crisis.
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Figure 24: Average generosity for age 40 man receiving Unemployment
Compensation 1973-2009

Source:(Pontusson and Raess 2012)

Mettler

For Suzanne Mettler, the Andersen model is far too simplistic and cannot isolate what
she perceives to be the key factor in welfare behavior: visibility. For Mettler and authors such
as Christopher Howard and Jacob Hacker, the crucial interests which shape policy outcomes
cannot be explained, for better or worse, by the interests of the average voter. Instead, they
believe that specific interests have greater ability to work out of sight within the policy
decision making process to effect “invisible” but substantially important policy changes. By
invisible policy process, Mettler only means that there are obstructions which prevent active
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opinion making and open dissent by the populous for policy decisions which go against
national values. In essence then, people don’t have the proper information to form an
accurate public consensus of national values because they aren’t given the information which
in turn also prevents them from openly opposing decisions which violate the normative
general social values.

United Kingdom Results
In terms of the presence of what Mettler would categorize as “organized narrow
interests” there is certainly evidence that the Confederation of Business Interests fits the bill.
In particular, the writings of Kevin Farnsworth give credit to the conclusion that these
interests have an impact on the decision making process and are indeed active participants in
the legislative discourse. Furthermore, those business interests seem to mirror the political
shifts in power as deindustrialization and globalization has destabilized the importance of
unions, even in the Labour Party, which has also moved significantly to the right over the
past few decades. Most importantly however, Mettler predicts that where such interests exist,
there is a necessary goal of entrenching and defending those interests against potential
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encroachment. As such, we would expect to see a controlled policy dialogue and what
Mettler describes as an invisible policy process which, in theory, protects the organized
narrow interests.
As for the presence of such an invisible policy process in the United Kingdom, it is
certainly much more difficult to tell. Mettler herself relies on questions of policy experience
as well as general inconsistencies between what the general public think is going on and what
is actually going on, with the added expectation that the programs are either more generous
than reality or have the inability to perceive where the benefits are going. In particular,
evidence in the UK is that as programs which provide benefits to the unemployed consolidate
and change under the Department of Works and Pensions has clouded perceptions of reliance
on the JSA. Specifically, in the table below, we can see that the jobless population is
diverging more and more rapidly from the group of unemployed who are actually collecting
the JSA.
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It is not clear what has occurred, but it is certainly clear that these policies are
becoming harder to access even as opposition based on dependence is coming to a head in
the media and political discourse. It is hard to say, however, if this is indicative of a truly
“invisible policy process” as Mettler would describe it, because one of the key characteristics
of her analysis rests on invisible policies which the general public don’t understand, and as
such, are unable to resist the programs they do not like and support the programs they do like
in the voting process. Because the programs in the United Kingdom are mostly cash benefits
which are primarily publically generated and delivered with clear linkages to the federal
government, it is my guess that Mettler would consider the UK to have a fairly visible
welfare state. This makes sense if we consider the political consensus amongst the
population, as well as within the political discourse, but sits in contradiction to her models’
suggestion that an invisible policy process is the key to understanding why organized
interests are able to thrive in the policy making process.
Moving to Mettler’s intervening variable of public passivity, further complications arise
in the explanatory progression of Mettler’s model as it might apply to the UK case study. In
particular, the idea that organized narrow interests do not perfectly match those interests held
as national values of welfare spending is the key to understanding why she thinks that an
invisible policy process is the key factor for preventing active and organized public protest.
In the previous section we see that the UK arguably does not fit the conditions which Mettler
might expect to see in terms of an invisible policy process, even as there is a significant
presence of organized business advocate groups entrenched in the policy decision making
process. In this more visible welfare state, Mettler would expect to see opposition to those
interest groups and the policies which they may be helping to perpetuate at the expense of
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citizens preferences. In the UK there is a clear and significant level of public dissent in the
form of the UK Uncut organization, which is formally organized and active enough to garner
fairly extensive media coverage as they fight against cuts and restrictions to unemployment
benefits. However, the presence of this active organization does not seem to have any major
impacts on public opinion, the political discourse or the benefits provided, which are
measured and fairly consistent in the Andersen model discussed above.
Finally, Mettler focusses on what she considers to be the hidden national values and the
idea that people, when given all the information needed to make accurate and informed
decisions about supporting and opposing policies, possess more egalitarian values than are
represented by general survey date because the invisible policy process obstructs actual
opinion formation. In order to measure the gap between the values being projected in policy
decisions, as well as the more egalitarian values she believes people genuinely hold but are
being obstructed from the policy process. However, in the UK there is fairly significant data
which suggest that the UK welfare state is pretty visible, there is a clear political consensus
and people really do have negative views on unemployment compensation programs. In other
words, Mettler would probably predict in a visible state, egalitarian values would prevail;
however in the United Kingdom the case is clearly the opposite and her variables are moving
in opposite directions, no matter the direction of the invisible policy process.
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Suzanne Mettler specifically designed and intended to utilize this model to explain
United States policy behavior. It is therefore not surprising that there is a strong elite theory
literature which emphasizes the role of business interests as a dominate force within the
policy decision making process. Furthermore, the emphasis on business interests is supported
by a similar focus on the rapid decline in labor interests as traditional union power has
deteriorated from deindustrialization and globalization. In particular, the key interests groups
in my study have exhibited all the classical trappings of having unequal access to the policy
process in keeping with the general literature as well as Mettler’s predictions.
These organized narrow interests being exercised, both in the form of significant
financial resources, in the case of the Chamber of Commerce as the number one lobby firm
in the political process, as well as face time with key political actors and decision making
committees for organizations like the Business Roundtable which is made up of the most
influential CEO’s in the United States. Theorist like Pierson and Hacker agree with Mettler
that these interests have a significant impact on the policy process which actively blocks
competing public interests and legislation which does not conform to their policy goals. In
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particular, this phenomenon is consistently captured in the United States by the maintenance
of political gridlock and prevention of significant policy reform.
The “Invisible Policy Process” is the trademark of Mettler’s theory; as such it is not
surprising again that there is a fair amount of evidence, both from her published studies as
well as other literature, which suggests that the American people do not have clear
conceptions of the realities of welfare programs. This is further in keeping with the idea that
where organized narrow interests are strong, so too will the level of policy invisibility, which
suggests that people do not have sufficient information to generate an accurate social
consensus in keeping with general national values. This is in keeping with patterns of
invisibility discussed both by Jacob Hacker as well as Christopher Howard; although both of
these authors suggest that the invisible policy process works in the opposite direction of
Mettler’s framework in that it provides additional benefits to the general public rather than
less, which Howard believes would be preferred when given perfect information and policy
consensus.
In particular, Mettler seems to do a good job of capturing some obstructive trends in
survey data which demonstrates a particularly passive political voice without majority
support or opposition for traditional welfare programs such as the EITC. This coincides with
her predictions that greater information has a strong correlation with an increasingly
egalitarian desire for programs which are effective in redistributing recourses away from the
rich and to the poor as seen in the findings below.
In regards to Mettler’s measure of public passivity, there is some evidence of active
and organizing groups of public dissenters. Under most circumstances the presence of such
interests groups would seem to contradict the flow of Mettler’s causal framework. However,
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because there is little to no evidence that these grassroots organizations have little to no real
impact on the policy decision making process, I believe Mettler would argue that her model
retains strong explanatory power. For this reason, I am prepared to concede the presence of
public passivity on account of the lack of effective public dissent, which could be seen to
garner enough political or media recognition to have an impact on final policy decisions, let
alone the policy discourse.
Concerning the final results within the dependent variable of Mettler’s framework,
which looks for gaps between the social assistance provided and the theoretically hidden
existence of egalitarian national values, we find some surprisingly anomalous data.
According to Mettler’s process tracing, we would consider that there would be evidence of
hidden egalitarian preferences imbedded within the invisible policy process. However, we
would also expect the United States to ignore these hidden values and retain stingy policy
patterns based on the power of the organized narrow interests of business elites and the
obstructive nature of the invisible policy process, which in turn, produced public passivity.
This is consistent with the evidence that people may have more egalitarian predispositions
than the general political dialogue.
The United States has nevertheless reacted in the exact opposite pattern predicted by
Mettler regarding the issues of youth unemployment and unemployment in general. In
essence, there have been uncharacteristically egalitarian trends in social protection and
redistribution in the form of significant extensions of programs and massive upshots in
spending on unemployment compensations schemes. This can be seen below in the
measurement of generosity of unemployment benefits for different OECD countries.
Specifically, it is important to notice how the UK reacts predictably, and in keeping with the
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stingy expectations, based on the prevailing models and data which starkly contrast the
United States which goes from one of the stingiest countries to more generous than several
countries including Germany; which is the opposite of the predictions made by Andersen and
even Mettler.

Source:(Pontusson and Raess 2012, c–2)

In my opinion, there are two possible explanations for this reasonable sudden break in
the U.S. behavior pattern. For starters, it is important to note that the data in all of Mettler’s
variables do suggest the presence of an invisible policy process, which is dominated by
organized narrow interests, and as such, it is unlikely to respond to egalitarian national values
even if they could be uncovered and organized. Therefore the deviations we see in the
dependent variable of social assistance provided and spending highlight gaps in the
explanatory framework of the model. The first explanation for this is that there is a variable
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missing, such as an account for the effects of political polarization in the policy process. In
particular, I believe that political polarization may offer key insight in understanding the
anomalous data because the dramatic increases in “generosity” occurred within the controlled
political environment of total control of the Executive and Legislative branches of the
government by the Democratic Party in 2008 and 2009. This explanation goes along with the
predictions made by Jonas Pontusson and Damien Raess who note the effects of different
administrations on different policy outcomes saying: “there can be little doubt that the
Obama administration pursued more expansionary policies in 2008-2010 than a Republican
administration would have done” (Pontusson and Raess 2012, 28).
Another possible explanation for the recent upshots in measured generosity within the
U.S. welfare state is the idea that this was simply a precautionary stimulus attempt rather
than a true shift in the ideological policy behavior of the United States. In this light, we can
rationalize the sudden jump as nothing more than a preemptive attempt to avert or at least
curb the effects of major economic recession amidst such speculation at the time of the
housing market crash in 2007. This explanation of defensive stimulus may hold some
significant weight when you consider the general agreement among economist that social
handouts to the very poor or economically at risk individuals is one of the most effective
ways to stimulate the economy because they are all but guaranteed to spend everything they
are given. However, nobody can truly explain this empirical “generosity shift” in the U.S.
welfare state without future data which may tell us if this was a short term spending strategy,
a fluke of consolidated power in a highly polarized environment, or indeed if the U.S. is
vocalizing more egalitarian values in welfare policy outcomes which Mettler believes have
previously been obstructed.
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All I know is that these anomalous results of sudden and apparently egalitarian
spending present problems for Mettler’s formation of the U.S. welfare state because it is
unclear, based on the direction of the other variables she has chosen to highlight in her
framework, why such increases in spending have occurred.

Conclusions

Andersen Model results
Variables

United
Kingdom
predictions

United
Kingdom
results

United
States
predictions

United
States
results

National Values*

Hi

Hi

Hi

Hi

Support within
the Legislature….
Spending…………..

Hi

Hi

Hi

Low

Low

Low

Low

Hi

*based on Andersen’s formulation of typical Liberal welfare state values

Mettler Model results
Variables

Organized Narrow
Interests…………….
Invisible Policy
Process………………
Public Passivity…..
Egalitarian values
Pursued…………….

United
Kingdom
Predictions

United
Kingdom
results

United
States
predictions

United
States
results

Low

Hi

Hi

Hi

Low

Mid

Hi

Hi

Hi

Low

Hi

Hi

Hi

Low

Low

Hi

In sum, the Andersen Model appears to do a fairly good job of capturing general
trends in policy behavior within the UK welfare state, but not nearly as good in explaining
the patterns in the U.S. welfare state. The Mettler Model, being specifically designed to
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address what she perceives as the more complicated U.S. welfare behavior pattern, naturally
does a somewhat better job of isolating variables that probably do play a significant role in
U.S. policy generation, such as the role of organized narrow interests. However, it must be
said that there are problems with the clarity of how those variables relate to one another in a
linear or explanatory way. Furthermore, neither model has the capacity to explain the
American spending reaction in both models’ dependent variables. These holes in the model
may come in part from limited data availability in terms of better survey questions or more in
depth spending data mirrored across both cases. However, these holes also certainly shine a
light on avenues open to further study and examination to make these models better at
explaining the data found in this study.
For instance, there does seem to be a lack of focus on the role of political polarization
and the impact it may have on policy outcomes. This is important because the level of
political polarization was one of the starkest differences I found in my research, between the
two cases. Furthermore, it would seem that the role of almost pure polarization in the United
States, with the so called Democratic regime of 2008-2010, followed by years of continued
control by both the presidency and the U.S. Senate still going on today, has had some impact
on the rapid extensions to unemployment compensation schemes in the United States. In
contrast, the UK acted very predictably according to the Andersen model with very little
political polarization. In fact, it appears that the whole political culture has shifted to be more
fiscally conservative and market oriented. I assert that it would be worth digging deeper into
this shift, particularly on the part of the Labour Party which appears to have had a major
ideological shift among its voter support base which is being clearly represented in their
policy platform outlined in chapter 3.
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Another consideration for future analysis in this area would be determining whether
Suzanne Mettler’s work can be made more broadly applicable as a framework for
understanding the policy behavior of countries other than the United States. As we saw in the
results of this study, the Mettler model did a much better job of capturing trends in the United
States than it did when applied to the United Kingdom. However, it is important to
understand whether this was a result of Mettler’s singularly focused attention to the study of
the American welfare state, or is it because the United States is uniquely complex, and as
such, not comparable or generalizable to other western welfare states. Does the federalism
structure which U.S. welfare programs operate imbue the U.S. with more levels of
invisibility not faced by other welfare states? I believe these are important questions for
future research.
What is clear in light of this research is that the UK welfare state does seem to be
more visible with some clear patterns to be explained and does seem to be moving towards
greater stinginess, of fiscal conservatism, as Andersen would predict. With the U.S., on the
other hand, it is much more difficult to capture the relationships of many of the variables
which means either we are missing some key variables all together or we did not have the
best information by which to judge the patterns found. In terms of further academic pursuits
on the subject of youth unemployment, it is clear at least that the impacts of youth
unemployment, and how states are going to respond to these new challenges, are highly
contested and unclear. In this regard, future endeavors to study this new policy area and
future policy phenomenon would do well to study different ways that this group may achieve
greater policy pressure because the standard used in this study of mere presence of public
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pressure groups does not seem to be enough to understand why states will react more or less
generously to their needs.
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